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Rhett B. Larson 
ABSTRACT—Climate change, as the dominant paradigm in natural 
resource policy, is obsolete and should be replaced by the water security 
paradigm. The climate change paradigm is obsolete because it fails to 
adequately resonate with the concerns of the general public and fails to 
integrate fundamental sustainability challenges related to economic 
development and population growth. The water security paradigm directly 
addresses the main reasons climate change ultimately matters to most 
people—droughts, floods, plagues, and wars. Additionally, this new 
proposed paradigm better integrates climate change concerns with other 
pressing global sustainability challenges—including that economic 
development and population growth will require 50% more food and 
energy and 30% more water by 2030 regardless of climate change. The 
water security paradigm orients all natural resource policies toward 
achieving a sustainable quantity and quality of water at acceptable costs 
and risks. Water security improves upon the climate change paradigm in 
several ways: it (1) replaces carbon footprints with water footprints as the 
metric for sustainability monitoring and reporting, (2) restructures natural 
resource governance at the watershed level with regional, rather than 
hierarchical, leadership, (3) integrates security and public health concerns 
into natural resource policies, (4) encourages investment in infrastructure 
for drought and flood resilience, and (5) facilitates the sustainable 
implementation of human rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change should be deemphasized in law and policy. Not 
because the science behind climate change is bad (it is not)1 and not 
because climate change is not important (it is).2 Climate change should be 
 
 1 See Sheila Jasanoff, Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
1723, 1741 (2015) (noting the scientific “consensus on the anthropogenic origins of climate change and 
some of the dire implications of unchecked global-mean-temperature rise”); see also Naomi Oreskes, 
The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCI. 1686 (2004) (summarizing the prevailing 
scientific consensus surrounding the causes and implications of global climate change). For a detailed 
discussion of climate change science and background on how anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
impact global climate patterns, see generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001). 
 2 Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 
115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1493 (2006) (including “climate change” in a list of “critical issues” that national 
governments alone struggle to address); Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 907 (2011) 
(stressing the “importan[ce]” of “[i]ssues like climate change”); Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, 
Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1531 (2009) (“This Essay shows that 
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deemphasized and indeed replaced as a policy paradigm because it is 
incomplete and ineffective.3 Instead, the new paradigm for natural resource 
law and policy should be centered on water security, a paradigm that avoids 
the limitations and inadequacies of the dominant climate change discourse.4 
The climate change paradigm is inadequate for three reasons. First, 
climate change does not sufficiently resonate with the general public.5 Even 
the phrase climate change evokes leaves changing colors in the fall and 
flowers blooming in the spring; global warming evokes long summer days. 
Talk of rising sea levels sounds only like the promise of living closer to the 
beach. To the average person, a problem framed in terms of a few degrees 
Celsius or a few feet of sea level rise does not sound very serious, and a 
problem framed in terms of ice caps or polar bears does not sound very 
relevant.6 Furthermore, carbon footprints and greenhouse gas emissions are 
performance metrics so unfamiliar to most people that they struggle to 
assess both the severity of the problem and the likelihood of success of 
proposed solutions.7 Efforts to make climate change more accessible have 
been moderately successful,8 and the climate change paradigm has 
 
the United States has reason to take prompt and aggressive action to address climate change, not out of 
benevolence or guilt, but out of self-interest.”). 
 3 Cf. Orr Karassin, Mind the Gap: Knowledge and Need in Regulating Adaptation to Climate 
Change, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 383 (2010) (noting that existing regulatory approaches to 
climate change adaptation incompletely address long-term sustainability challenges); John D. Sterman 
& Linda Booth Sweeney, Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change: Adults’ Mental 
Models of Climate Change Violate Conservation of Matter, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 213, 235–36 (2007) 
(documenting prevalent misunderstandings of basic climate science among science-educated subjects 
and discussing how public discourse regarding climate change has been ineffective in generating public 
support for climate change mitigation and adaptation policies). 
 4 See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Does 
Chevron Set the EPA Free?, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 319 (2010) (providing an example and critique 
of the dominant approach to climate change mitigation—through regulatory measures aimed at 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions). 
 5 See Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the Military, and Society, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 1772, 1788–89 (2014) (proposing that reframing climate change discourse in terms 
of national security may improve the resonance of climate discourse with certain segments of the 
public, as compared to framing the discourse in terms of environmental and sustainability concerns); 
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 (2007) (“Climate change generally does not trigger strong emotions, and 
people are willing to consider whether significant harm is probable.”). 
 6 See Anthony A. Leiserowitz, American Risk Perceptions: Is Climate Change Dangerous?, 
25 RISK ANALYSIS 1433, 1438 (2005) (finding that, among those tested, climate change was most 
commonly associated with images of “melting glaciers and polar ice,” and that “[Americans] think the 
impacts [of climate change] will mostly affect people and places that are geographically and temporally 
distant”). 
 7 See infra Section I.C. 
 8 See generally Tien Ming Lee et al., Predictors of Public Climate Change Awareness and Risk 
Perception Around the World, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1014, 1014–20 (2015) (discussing the 
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advanced important goals of sustainability and resiliency.9 But much more 
is necessary to broadly engage and educate people regarding the impacts 
and importance of adapting to changing global climate patterns.10 
Relatedly, the phrase climate change has become so politically 
charged as to become a liability in advancing sustainable natural resource 
policies, particularly in light of the election of Donald Trump as President 
of the United States and demonstrated by his announcement that the United 
States will withdraw from the Paris Accords addressing climate change 
mitigation.11 Climate change, as a policy brand, has become so politicized 
as to frequently paralyze discourse on sustainability. Something that should 
be as controversial as carrying an umbrella when the forecast is rainy has 
somehow become a new third rail that is rarely discussed in political 
discourse. Trump’s election has strengthened the political position of 
climate change deniers and put those who do not highly prioritize climate 
change mitigation and adaptation in positions of influence over federal 
natural resource policies.12 If the aims of the sustainable natural resource 
policy agenda are to be advanced in the new administration, then scholars, 
activists, and policy entrepreneurs may find it necessary to talk about 
climate change without saying climate change. 
The second reason the climate change paradigm is inadequate is 
because it is incomplete. Climate change is not the most pressing natural 
resource problem. The most pressing problem is that, by 2030, global 
population growth and economic development will increase demand for 
food and energy by 50% and for freshwater by 30%, whether or not the 
 
results of a survey of 119 countries to identify predictors and effective messages for conveying the risks 
of global climate change). 
 9 See, e.g., Carol E. Lee & William Mauldin, U.S., China Agree on Implementing Paris Climate 
Change Pact; Obama, Xi Seek to Demonstrate Accord Between Developed and Developing Nations, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-agree-on-implementing-paris-
climate-change-pact-1472896645 [https://perma.cc/DC29-K7X9]. The U.N. Convention on Climate 
Change and its associated Kyoto Protocol and recent Paris Accords are admirable advances in 
international cooperation in addressing climate change. 
 10 Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135, 1139 (2009). 
 11 For a general discussion of the politically controversial nature of climate change, see generally 
Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 1295 (2009). See also Clare Foran, 
Donald Trump and the Triumph of Climate-Change Denial, ATLANTIC (Dec. 25, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/donald-trump-climate-change-skeptic-
denial/510359/ [https://perma.cc/S6LH-9CLU]; Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from 
Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/ 
trump-paris-climate-agreement.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/4PY3-J8KC] . 
 12 Foran, supra note 11; see also Ben Wolfgang, Republican Attorneys General Eager to Dismantle 
Obama Climate Change Agenda Under Donald Trump, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016),  
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/26/republican-attorneys-general-eager-to-dismantle-
ob/ [https://perma.cc/8VLM-SSCC] (detailing the efforts of Republican attorneys general to eliminate 
regulations based on climate change concerns). 
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climate continues to change.13 Global consumption of natural resources is 
“unsustainable,”14 and climate change makes this pressing problem worse.15 
While climate change is an aggravating factor in the challenge of natural 
resource management,16 the current climate change paradigm results in 
narrowly defining “sustainable” or “green” behaviors as those that have a 
low carbon footprint without factoring in the myriad ways such behaviors 
might be otherwise harmful.17 
Third, the deficiencies of the climate change paradigm have arisen 
because it is being led by the wrong people. The early development of the 
climate change paradigm was largely hierarchical, meaning its trajectory 
was set by a top-down, national and supranational agenda.18 While this 
approach made sense at the time given climate change’s global reach, it has 
resulted in decisionmaking that is frequently attenuated from the unique 
 
 13 See Patricia Wouters et al., Water Security, Hydrosolidarity, and International Law: A River 
Runs Through It . . ., 19 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 97, 98 & n.6 (2009) (citing C. McGourty, Global Crisis 
‘to Strike by 2030’, BBC NEWS (March 19, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7951838.stm 
[https://perma.cc/T36R-PBKS] (quoting Professor John Beddington, U.K. Government Chief Scientist, 
who referred to the likely water stress caused by economic development, population growth, and 
climate change as the “perfect storm” for a global energy and food crisis)); see also Rhett B. Larson, 
Reconciling Energy and Food Security, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 929, 932 n.13 (2014) [hereinafter Larson, 
Reconciling Energy]. 
 14 See L. Hunter Lovins, Climate Capitalism: The Business Case for Climate Protection, 27 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 735, 744 (2010) (“[O]n the environment front, as our financial debts have built up, so 
have our debts to nature—in terms of the unsustainable depletion of natural resources, measured by the 
loss of topsoil, forests, fresh water and biodiversity. Everybody knows that liquidating capital assets to 
fuel consumption is crazy but nobody seems to know how to stop it. There is a simple conclusion here: 
the self-same abuses of debt-driven ‘casino capitalism’ that have caused the global economy to collapse 
are what lie behind the impending collapse of the life-support systems on which we all ultimately 
depend.” (quoting Jonathon Porritt, Perfect Storm of Environmental and Economic Collapse Closer 
than You Think, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/mar/23/ 
jonathon-porritt-recession-climate-crisis [https://perma.cc/LSH6-EBTD])). 
 15 Wouters et al., supra note 13, at 98. 
 16 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1175 (2009) (“Addressing climate change 
by reducing resource consumption can also be especially difficult to accomplish.”).  
 17 See Sarah Tran, Expediting Innovation, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 123, 154–55 (2012) (noting 
that in the energy-usage context, the adjective “green” is “ubiquitous and implies broadly that 
something is ‘environmentally friendly,’ ‘recyclable,’ ‘biodegradable,’ or ‘energy efficient’” (quoting 
Roger D. Wynne, Defining “Green”: Toward Regulation of Environmental Marketing Claims, 24 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 785, 786 (1991)); see also infra Section I.C. Nuclear and hydroelectric energy, for 
example, have low carbon footprints, but neither is obviously green or sustainable. 
 18 See William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global 
Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457, 457–58, 
496 (2010) (finding that an “Earth systems governance approach to the climate change problem”—one 
administered through “a top-down, supra-national regime”—“has become deeply embedded as a basic 
objective of climate policy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Rethinking a 
Failing Framework: Adaptation and Institutional Rebirth for the Global Climate Change Regime, 
25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 26 (2012). 
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local, cultural, economic, and natural conditions of the resources implicated 
by climate change.19 Localized leadership is necessary to take a more 
nuanced approach, and improved natural resource management is more 
likely to be achieved in a paradigm that focuses on localized resources 
rather than a global commons problem like climate change.20 Our 
sustainability challenges should be rebranded in a way that makes sense to 
the general public, is adapted to the local and regional conditions and 
characteristics of our natural resources, and integrates the human and 
environmental impacts of rising food, water, and energy demands with 
concerns associated with climate change.   
Scientists have long been searching for a unified field theory—one 
equation that answers all the questions we have about the physical 
universe.21 Natural resource law and policy need a unified sustainability 
paradigm—something that integrates all of our sustainability challenges 
into one measurable and accessible goal.22 To that end, this Article will 
argue that the current narrow and inaccessible climate change paradigm 
should be replaced by one that focuses on a more immediate problem: 
water security. Water security, as it has been previously defined, is “the 
availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water . . . with an 
acceptable level of water-related risks.”23 Framing our policies around 
water not only appropriately prioritizes our problems but better integrates 
them. Water security directly addresses the reasons climate change matters 
to most people—it has exacerbated the threat of droughts, floods, 
 
 19 For a general discussion of how more localized approaches to natural resource governance can 
facilitate effective response to the challenges of climate change, see generally Hari M. Osofsky, Is 
Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 587 
(2009) [hereinafter Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?] (arguing for the need to have 
“multiscalar legal approaches” to sustainability issues that incorporate greater localized regulation and 
engagement). 
 20 For a discussion of how collaboration among regional and local leadership can lead to improved 
natural resource management and sustainable policies, see generally Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at 
the Pool: State Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 
36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2012). 
 21 See generally BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE (1999) (providing an overview and 
history of the pursuit of the unified field theory amongst scientists). 
 22 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of 
Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1417–18, 1465–67 
(1996) (examining the development of environmental law and finding that its current federal regulatory 
approach may be in need of evolutionary transformation). 
 23 David Grey & Claudia W. Sadoff, Sink or Swim? Water Security for Growth and Development, 
9 WATER POL’Y 545, 547–48 (2007) (defining “water security” and discussing water security in terms 
of anticipated costs and benefits); see also Rhett B. Larson, War and Water, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rhett-b-larson/war-and-water_b_5940892.html 
[https://perma.cc/E87M-NSUN] [hereinafter Larson, War and Water]. 
112:139 (2017) Water Security 
145 
displacement, plagues, and wars.24 The water security paradigm would thus 
highlight problems and events to which the general public can relate—
droughts in California and Brazil, water protests in Michigan and Ireland, 
water conflict in Syria and Kashmir, stagnating economic development in 
Ghana, water-related epidemics like cholera in Haiti, and floods in France 
and Louisiana.25 That is because water is not just the most important thing.26 
Water is food and energy, war and disease, racial and gender equality, and 
immigration and economic development.27 “[Water] is everything.”28 
 
 24 See Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable Energy and the Public Trust Doctrine, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1021, 1064–65 (2012) (listing increased droughts and floods among the “risks associated with 
climate change”). But cf. Jason Scott Johnston, Problems of Equity and Efficiency in the Design of 
International Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Schemes, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 407–10 (2009) 
(suggesting that, although popular media report that global warming may lead to dire regional 
consequences in developing countries, there remains “substantial uncertainty about how much, if at all, 
different countries would benefit from present-day reductions in [greenhouse gas] emissions”). Water 
insecurity frequently causes or aggravates armed conflict and poverty, leading refugees and immigrants 
to flee war and seek opportunity. See Larson, War and Water, supra note 23. 
 25 Aurelien Breeden & Katarina Johannsen, From Paris to Bavaria, Heavy Rains Cause Deadly 
Floods, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/world/europe/france-
germany-floods-rain.html [https://perma.cc/NP53-74QT]; Mary M. Chapman, Hundreds in Detroit 
Protest over Move to Shut Off Water, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/
19/us/protesters-picket-detroit-over-move-to-shut-off-water.html [https://perma.cc/56L2-Y9CK]; 
Suzanne Daley, A New Irish Rebellion, This Time Against Water Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2015) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/world/europe/many-in-ireland-vow-not-to-pay-a-new-water-
tax.html [https://perma.cc/5CBY-FLJU]; Moses Mozart Dzawu, A Water Crisis Threatens Ghana’s 
Economic Growth, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 11, 2013, 6:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2013-04-11/a-water-crisis-threatens-ghanas-economic-growth [https://perma.cc/ACC7-F33N]; 
Joshua Hammer, Is a Lack of Water to Blame for the Conflict in Syria?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June 
2013), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/is-a-lack-of-water-to-blame-for-the-conflict-in-
syria-72513729/ [http://perma.cc/ST8F-ZAHQ]; Jenny Jarvie, Historic Flooding Kills 8 in Louisiana as 
Thousands Scramble for Safety, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016, 8:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/nationnow/la-na-louisiana-flooding-20160815-snap-story.html [http://perma.cc/98VE-44WG]; 
Niharika Mandhana, Water Wars: Why India and Pakistan are Squaring Off over Their Rivers, TIME 
(Apr. 16, 2012), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2111601,00.html 
[http://perma.cc/U7BE-GRWH]; Adam Nagourney et al., California Drought Tests History of Endless 
Growth, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/us/california-drought-tests-
history-of-endless-growth.html?mcubz=0 [http://perma.cc/R56W-3CUX]; Renaud Piarroux, The U.N.’s 
Responsibility in Haiti’s Cholera Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/09/08/opinion/the-uns-responsibility-in-haitis-cholera-crisis.html?mcubz=0 
[http://perma.cc/6X2X-NSRZ]; Kenneth Rapoza, Brazil’s Biggest Drought in Decades Also Worsens 
Interest Rate Outlook, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2014, 8:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
kenrapoza/2014/03/25/brazils-biggest-drought-in-decades-also-worsens-interest-rate-outlook/ 
[https://perma.cc/R7WR-FH3T]. 
 26 See Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2187 (2013) 
[hereinafter Larson, The New Right]. 
 27 See generally Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13 (discussing how water security 
integrates concerns surrounding food and energy production and transmission); Inga T. Winkler et al., 
Treasuring What We Measure and Measuring What We Treasure: Post-2015 Monitoring for the 
Promotion of Equality in the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Sector, 32 WIS. INT’L L.J. 547 (2014) 
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes and evaluates the 
shifting dominant paradigms in natural resource law and policy up to the 
most recent: the climate change paradigm. The climate change paradigm 
has made important progress in addressing a critical issue, but its 
inaccessibility and incompleteness—partially driven by its top-down 
leadership—renders it inadequate and ripe for replacement. That 
incompleteness is partly due to the limitations of a “hierarchist”-led 
movement. These movements are characterized by decisionmakers who are 
remote from and unfamiliar with unique local conditions and, thus, less 
informed about the impact of their interventions on communities. 
Part II defines the water security paradigm and explains why it should 
replace the climate change paradigm. The water security paradigm 
responds to the two fundamental limitations of the climate change 
paradigm—its inaccessibility and lack of resonance with the general public 
and its failure to address rising food, water, and energy demands that exist 
independent of climate change. The new paradigm is labeled water security 
to explicitly engage with the ongoing dialogue regarding both food and 
energy security and to elevate water to the prime consideration in this 
dialogue.29 The water security paradigm focuses on the issues most 
accessible and relevant to the general public in part by replacing the carbon 
emissions regime with the more integrated and understandable water 
footprint, including “virtual water.” Virtual water is the water embedded in 
all products.30 As such, water footprint reporting that accounts for virtual 
water would give a more accurate and integrated picture of sustainability 
than mere carbon footprint reporting.31 Part II also describes how the water 
security paradigm could affect governance structures. In particular, 
wherever possible, jurisdictional boundaries should be drawn to correspond 
to the watershed by interjurisdictional agreements to encourage cost 
 
(noting the disproportionate burden water insecurity has on women and girls and on racial and ethnic 
minorities). 
 28 Jacinta Ruru, The Right to Water as the Right to Identity: Legal Struggles of Indigenous Peoples 
of Aotearoa New Zealand, in THE RIGHT TO WATER 110, 110 (Farhana Sultana & Alex Loftus eds., 
2012). 
 29 In a previous article, I described the concept of water security as a policy paradigm and situated 
that paradigm within a broader discussion of security in food and energy policy. The discussion of 
water security in Part II of this Article draws largely from the ideas developed in that article. See 
Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13. 
 30 See J.A. (Tony) Allan, Virtual Water - the Water, Food, and Trade Nexus: Useful Concept or 
Misleading Metaphor?, 28 WATER INT’L 4, 5 (2003) [hereinafter Allan, Virtual Water] (defining virtual 
water as “the water needed to produce agricultural commodities” but acknowledging that “[t]he concept 
could be expanded to include the water needed to produce non-agricultural commodities” as well). 
 31 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 952–55. 
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internalization and lower transaction costs.32 Because of this more localized 
approach, the water security paradigm should be led by embedded norm 
entrepreneurs at the basin level—what this Article calls “regionalists.” 
Part III proposes three reforms in environmental and natural resource 
law that will advance the water security paradigm and explains why 
successful implementation of those reforms is more likely under a water 
security paradigm than a climate change paradigm. First, nations should 
recognize a sustainable human right to water. Many nations currently 
recognize a human right to water but implement it in a way that is neither 
economically nor ecologically sustainable.33 A sustainable human right to 
water facilitates public participation in water resource planning, encourages 
full cost recovery and water conservation through cost internalization, and 
promotes transparency and investment in water utilities infrastructure.34 
Second, water law has historically focused primarily on what this 
Article refers to as the “Green Agenda” (water quality) and the “Blue 
Agenda” (water supply), often to the exclusion or detriment of the “Red 
Agenda” (control of pathogens and disease vectors, such as mosquitoes).35 
The water crisis in Flint, Michigan, illustrates one way in which the Blue 
Agenda (seeking a cheaper water source from the Flint River) conflicted 
with the Green Agenda (high chloride concentrations in raw water leaching 
lead out of an outdated infrastructure) and the Red Agenda (outbreaks of 
Legionnaires’ Disease).36 Water law should be reformed to better integrate 
the Red Agenda.37 Approvals of water projects like dams and irrigation 
systems should include mandatory assessments of the impact of water 
infrastructure projects on disease vector habitat.38 Third and finally, legal 
reforms that facilitate investment in innovative water augmentation and 
conservation technologies, such as desalination, and investment in water 
infrastructure to increase drought and flood resiliency, such as dams and 
reservoirs, should be implemented. Ultimately, the greatest challenge of 
 
 32 I described the importance of river-basin-level governance for water resources in a previous 
article. The discussion in Part II on basin-level governance draws largely from the ideas developed in 
that article. See generally Rhett B. Larson, Interstitial Federalism, 62 UCLA L. REV. 908 (2015) 
[hereinafter Larson, Interstitial Federalism]. 
 33 See Rhett B. Larson, Adapting Human Rights, 26 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2015) 
[hereinafter Larson, Adapting Human Rights] (discussing how guaranteeing water provision under a 
human rights approach can result in poor cost recovery and limited incentives for conservation). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See generally Rhett B. Larson, Law in the Time of Cholera, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1271 
(2017) [hereinafter Larson, Time of Cholera] (describing the framework for evaluating the different 
water agendas of supply, quality, and public health based on color). 
 36 Id. at 1299–1300. 
 37 Id. at 1275–76. 
 38 Id. at 1311, 1315–17. 
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climate change will be increased water variability,39 and that variability can 
be mitigated by advancing water conservation and augmentation 
technologies and responsibly developing large dams. The proposed legal 
reforms are more likely to be effectively implemented under a new 
hydrocentric policy paradigm and will serve both to orient law and policy 
toward the aims of water security and to help achieve water security at 
local, national, and international levels. 
Part IV concludes by discussing the theoretical core of the water 
security paradigm, which is based on two related concepts: (1) adaptive 
capacity in the law as a means of achieving fairness, and (2) the 
abandonment of “normal” in resource management toward an approach of 
resilience to extreme conditions. Water security requires laws that adapt to 
water reality and produce resilience to water extremes. Part IV also 
addresses the promise, and potential limitations and criticisms, of the water 
security paradigm, concluding that reframing our natural resource policy 
dialogue around water security will lead to improved resource management 
and avoid policy stalemates associated with the climate change paradigm. 
Water security reframes the discussion for those who do not want to talk 
about climate change—without abandoning its essential message—and 
simultaneously starts a conversation about sustainability grounded in our 
most critical resource. 
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE PARADIGM 
Before reorienting the aims of natural resource law and policy toward 
water security, it is essential to first understand the current climate change 
paradigm, how it has evolved, and why it no longer suffices to address 
sustainability challenges. Section A describes the historical evolution of 
natural resource policy paradigms, Section B distinguishes the climate 
change paradigm from its predecessor paradigms and argues that climate 
change is the current dominant natural resource policy paradigm, and 
Section C explains why the climate change paradigm is no longer adequate 
and needs to be supplanted. 
A. The Evolution of Natural Resource Policy Paradigms 
A policy paradigm is a distinct conceptual framework within which 
policy decisions are made and justified.40 A policy paradigm includes 
 
 39 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 951. 
 40 See Daniel Béland & Robert Henry Cox, Introduction to Special Issue: The Politics of Policy 
Paradigms, 26 GOVERNANCE 193, 193 (2013) (“Policymaking is dominated by paradigmatic thinking—
widely shared ways of thinking about policy challenges that lead to broad consensus about the 
appropriateness of a policy response.”); Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the 
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shared assumptions about problems and solutions, and it is often reinforced 
by framing those problems and proposed solutions within the context of 
that existing paradigm.41 Paradigms shift when predominant modes of 
thinking are challenged because those modes have proven inadequate or 
unsatisfactory.42 Initially, policymakers resist new paradigms because they 
do not fit within the existing paradigm.43 As the nascent paradigm proves 
effective at explaining or solving problems, and better than the old 
paradigm at integrating new technologies and information, it gains 
acceptance and legitimacy.44 As paradigms rise and fall, multiple paradigms 
may exist simultaneously within the same sphere,45 but typically one 
paradigm predominates.46 A new paradigm is often characterized and 
distinguished by the identity of the policy advocates who develop and rely 
on its increasingly accepted framework.47 Understanding why paradigms 
succeed and fail requires an examination of the actors who influenced the 
movement. Early advocates not only set the course but are often 
 
State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 279 (1993) 
(“[P]olicymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only 
the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature 
of the problems they are meant to be addressing . . . . I am going to call this interpretive framework a 
policy paradigm.”). 
 41 Michael H. Cohen, A Fixed Star in Health Care Reform: The Emerging Paradigm of Holistic 
Healing, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79, 85 (1995) (discussing the general concept of paradigm shifts while 
examining the rising paradigm of holistic healing and the ebbing paradigm of individual systems 
diagnostics and treatment in health care approaches). 
 42 See, e.g., George A. Martínez, Race and Immigration Law: A Paradigm Shift?, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 517, 524 (2000); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, The Persistent Problem of Obligation in International 
Law, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 271, 285–86 (2000). 
 43 See, e.g., ANATOLE KALETSKY, CAPITALISM 4.0 186 (2010) (noting that “academic 
establishments fight hard to resist paradigm shifts”); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS 150–52 (2d ed. 1970) (noting that older scientists resist paradigm shifts due in part to 
professional investments in existing paradigms). 
 44 See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Plight of the Secular Paradigm, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409, 
1418 (2013) (describing how a paradigm that persistently fails to “address[] anomalies and puzzles” 
may be “discarded in favor of a new one that” better “account[s] for all the evidence”). 
 45 See, e.g., Stephen A. Conrad, The Rhetorical Constitution of “Civil Society” at the Founding: 
One Lawyer’s Anxious Vision, 72 IND. L.J. 335, 347–48 (1997) (noting one scholar’s “emphasis on 
multiple, simultaneous, or chronologically overlapping paradigms of society” in the eighteenth 
century). 
 46 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1241 (1982) (acknowledging that “[i]n many studies . . . a single paradigm is 
seen to dominate an entire discipline for a lengthy period, only to be succeeded by another dominant 
paradigm following a revolutionary struggle” but ultimately finding a different pattern in which “a 
number of conflicting remedial paradigms coexist over a considerable period of time”). 
 47 See J. A. Allan, Water in the Environment/Socio-Economic Development Discourse: 
Sustainability, Changing Management Paradigms and Policy Responses in a Global System, 40 GOV’T 
& OPPOSITION 181, 193–95 (2005) [hereinafter Allan, Water in the Environment] (identifying each of 
five water management paradigms with the sector of society that chiefly participates in that paradigm).  
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disproportionately influential in outlining the goals of a paradigm’s policies 
and defining success.48 Some policy paradigms are hierarchical, in that they 
are top-down and driven by high-level government leadership at the 
national or even supranational governmental level. Borrowing Professor 
Allan’s term, I call these leaders hierarchists.49 Other policy paradigms are 
bottom-up initiatives, characterized as civil movements and distinguished 
by the leadership of ethicists concerned primarily with social justice.50 
Some policy paradigms are led by entrepreneurs in the private for-profit 
sector and focus on wealth maximization and efficiency.51 Of course, it is 
possible that multiple stakeholders lead the paradigm, in that ethicists, 
entrepreneurs, and hierarchists all work together.52 Still, it can be helpful to 
look to the earliest advocates of a particular paradigm as a means of 
categorizing paradigms and examining how their earliest advocates 
influence the trajectory of a paradigm’s development.53 
 
 48 John W. Lee & W. Eugene Seago, Policy Entrepreneurship, Public Choice, and Symbolic 
Reform Analysis of Section 198, the Brownfields Tax Incentive: Carrot or Stick or Just Never Mind?, 
26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 613, 639 (2002) (“Policy entrepreneurs adopt policy 
proposals in order to promote their own interests, gain favors and obligations for future bargaining . . . 
or just because they personally favor those particular policies as a matter of ideology or otherwise.”).  
 49 See Allan, Water in the Environment, supra note 47, at 193–95. 
 50 See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 
(2005) (discussing the civil movements aimed at economic development and social justice for 
disadvantaged communities, with particular emphasis on the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals); Allan, Water in the Environment, supra note 47, at 193–95. 
 51 See, e.g., Allan, Water in the Environment, supra note 47; see also Yochai Benkler, Commons 
and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499 
(2013) (reviewing BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE (2012) (noting the ongoing debate over 
the role of private sector leadership in shifting paradigms regarding management of shared resources)); 
Muthukumara Mani & Shreyasi Jha, Trade Liberalization and the Environment in Vietnam 2 (World 
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3879, 2006) (noting the role of entrepreneurs and the for-
profit sector in shifting paradigms to trade liberalization in Vietnam). 
 52 See, e.g., David J. Bederman, An Evaluation of the Contribution of the Conference, 22 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 201, 202 (2008) (noting the tension created by the simultaneous roles of both top-down 
and bottom-up leadership in the formulation of international law, particularly in the context of public 
health). 
 53 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 
99 YALE L.J. 251, 274–77 (1989) (noting the role of changing leadership in universities in the 
development of the academic freedom paradigm in higher education); Allen N. Sultan, Principal and 
Practical Foundations of a Global Constitutional Order, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 155, 161–
62 (2004) (noting the role of early leaders’ “moral courage” in setting a trajectory for paradigms in 
constitutional law). 
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1. The Industrial Paradigm 
The earliest broad frameworks for the management of natural 
resources emerged from the Industrial Revolution.54 The industrial 
paradigm was characterized by the leadership of entrepreneurs and driven 
by a reliance on market incentives.55 These incentives encouraged the 
development of natural resources and improved efficiencies in natural 
resource exploitation and in technological innovation but also led to many 
instances of the tragedy of the commons and negative externalities.56 The 
industrial paradigm is characterized by the leadership of entrepreneurs, 
such as John D. Rockefeller, who spurred economic development and 
technological innovation but at a heavy price of resource contamination 
and depletion.57 
In the context of water law and policy, the era of the industrial 
paradigm is characterized by the “hydraulic mission” whose hallmark is the 
subjugation and exploitation of water in pursuit of political legitimacy and 
economic development.58 The hydraulic mission was driven by “the strong 
conviction that every drop of water flowing to the ocean is a waste and that 
the state should develop hydraulic infrastructure to capture as much water 
as possible for human uses.”59 Water was dammed and polluted in pursuit 
of economic development, and it was treated as a commodity with 
economic, but not necessarily inherent, value.60 Furthermore, water was a 
 
 54 Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Where Did All the Blue Skies Go? Sustainability 
and Equity: The New Paradigm, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 399, 410 (1994) (providing an overview of the 
values of the industrial paradigm). 
 55 See generally THOMAS C. COCHRAN, FRONTIERS OF CHANGE (1981) (providing a comparative 
history of the early Industrial Revolution in the U.S. and Europe and noting the role of entrepreneurs 
and financiers in shaping that era). 
 56 See Collin & Collin, supra note 54, at 408–11. 
 57 See Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Cleaning Up Superfund: A Proposal for Permanent Cleanups and 
Returning Land Back to Nature—With Applications to the Petroleum Industry, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 335, 357–58 (1994) (detailing case studies demonstrating the public health, economic, and 
environmental impacts of resource exploitation in the oil and gas industry). 
 58 See Jeremy Allouche, The Multi-Level Governance of Water and State-Building Processes: A 
Longue Durée Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF WATER: A SURVEY 45, 58–59 (Kai Wegerich & Jeroen 
Warner eds., 1st ed. 2010) (defining the “hydraulic mission” as “an attempt to control and manipulate 
water resources of a country so that its constituents may meet their domestic, industrial and agricultural 
needs”); see also Kate Darling, A Weight for Water: An Ecological Feminist Critique of Emerging 
Norms and Trends in Global Water Governance, 13 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 368, 378 (2012) 
(discussing Allouche, supra); Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A 
New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 
109, 151–54 (1995) [hereinafter Wood, Protecting the Attributes]. 
 59 Philippus Wester et al., The Hydraulic Mission and the Mexican Hydrocracy: Regulating and 
Reforming the Flows of Water and Power, 2 WATER ALTERNATIVES 394, 396 (2009). 
 60 Darling, supra note 58, at 378. 
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symbol of political legitimacy,61 with operation of large water infrastructure 
perceived as essential to and demonstrative of political power: large dams, 
for example, stood as symbols of a regime’s strength and beneficence.62 As 
with any paradigm, the earliest advocates set the trajectory of the hydraulic 
mission and defined what success meant.63 Much like the industrial 
paradigm broadly,64 this trajectory was one of resource development and 
exploitation, and leaders sought to wring the maximum amount of 
economic value from each drop of water.65 
2. The Green Paradigm 
The growing challenges of pollution and resource depletion exposed 
the industrial paradigm’s failure to integrate consideration of these 
externalities.66 The industrial paradigm was ultimately challenged and 
supplanted by what I term the “green paradigm,”67 which focused on 
broadly limiting environmental damage through a system of “direct 
regulatory proscription.”68 The green paradigm also introduced other 
specific mechanisms for internalizing costs that were previously 
externalized; these include the permitting requirements of the Clean Water 
Act and Clean Air Act and the “polluter pays” principle of Superfund.69 
Additionally, the green paradigm saw the enactment of significant pieces of 
 
 61 See id. 
 62 Allouche, supra note 58, at 58–59; see also Wester et al., supra note 59, at 397–400 (detailing 
how Mexico’s Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Revolutionary Institutional Party) consolidated 
power in the twentieth century through water infrastructure development as an example of the hydraulic 
mission). 
 63 François Molle et al., Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission: Flows of Water, 
Flows of Power, 2 WATER ALTERNATIVES 328, 329–31 (2009) (describing political regimes throughout 
the world that relied on the ethos of the hydraulic mission to gain and secure power). 
 64 See Wood, Protecting the Attributes, supra note 58, at 152–56 (describing the “industrial 
development model” as one of two main economic paradigms in modern Indian Country and noting its 
focus on resource exploitation which has been to the long-term detriment of many tribes). 
 65 Molle et al., supra note 63, at 332. 
 66 See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 
149–50 (2004) (noting the aims of environmental law were in part to internalize externalities of 
industrial-scale pollution); Wyatt G. Sassman, Environmental Justice as Civil Rights, 18 RICH. J.L. & 
PUB. INT. 441, 456 (2015) (noting the role of environmental law in internalizing the costs of the 
industrial economy). 
 67 See generally GREEN PARADIGMS AND THE LAW (Nicole Rodgers ed., 1998) (providing, through 
a series of chapters, an overview and discussion of the “green paradigm” as an evolving set of norms 
and aims associated with environmental protection and resource sustainability). 
 68 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Framing Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 75, 75–77 (2008). 
 69 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. 
(2012); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or 
Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2012). 
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environmental protection legislation,70 and it encouraged greater 
transparency in natural resource management. Examples of this include 
environmental impact assessments under the National Environmental 
Protection Act (NEPA) and the listing and consultation requirements under 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA).71 
The green paradigm was marked by the leadership of ethicists,72 or 
nongovernmental actors, and by grassroots advocacy led by individuals 
such as Rachel Carson and Lois Gibbs.73 Beyond legislative reforms, the 
green paradigm led to Earth Day, a marked increase in “press coverage of 
the environment,” and generally broader awareness of human impacts on 
the environment.74 Ethicists set the green paradigm on a trajectory favoring 
bottom-up advocacy for interventions focused on the prevention of 
environmental harms and for a broader and stronger public “environmental 
ethos.”75 
 
 70 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 256, 301 (2010); see also Jim Chen, Legal Mythmaking in a Time of Mass Extinctions: 
Reconciling Stories of Origins with Human Destiny, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 292 (2005) (placing 
the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act within the category of “‘super-
statutes’ whose ‘institutional [and] normative’ impact reaches issues ordinarily addressed through 
constitutional law” (citing William Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 
1216 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes]); Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super Statutes, 
supra, at 1242–46 (describing the scope and significance of the Endangered Species Act in particular). 
 71 See Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2012); National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2012); Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the 
Environmental Right to Know, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1015–16 (2012) (discussing the NEPA 
requirements). 
 72 Cf., e.g., Roesler, supra note 71 (identifying the fundamental interests that underlie the right to 
demand disclosure of environmental information, including intellectual freedom, personal liberty, self-
government, and human health). 
 73 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 683, 691–99 (1999) (describing the ultimately exaggerated public response to the 1976 Love 
Canal overflow, the “key role” that local resident Lois Marie Gibbs “played . . . in reinforcing fears of 
adverse health effects [from the overflow] and mobilizing public attention,” and the resulting passage of 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)); see, e.g., 
RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); Roesler, supra note 71 (example of the incorporation of 
ethical considerations in environmental law illustrating the role of ethicists).  
 74 See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the 
Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 94–95 (2001). 
 75 See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: 
Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
53, 83 (2010) (discussing the “expansion of public trust concepts to the environment” as an 
improvement on regulatory law because a public trust is “more comprehensive in its considerations,” 
and noting one scholar’s description of the public trust doctrine as “the most compelling beacon for a 
fundamental and rapid paradigm shift towards sustainability” (quoting Mary Christina Wood, 
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future 
Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 45 
(2009) [hereinafter Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust])). 
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However, the green paradigm failed to account fully for the growing 
threat of global climate change and did not adequately address concerns of 
intergenerational equity.76 For example, the green agenda’s focus on 
pollution prevention and remediation aimed to achieve acceptable resource 
quality for the current generation but not necessarily resource sustainability 
for future generations.77 Furthermore, the green paradigm’s aims were 
diffuse and lacked integration, with efforts to address air pollution, 
hazardous waste, clean water, and endangered species embodied in 
independent regulatory schemes.78 What was needed, then, was a new 
paradigm that found ways to connect the disjointed aspects of the green 
movement and raise the priority of climate change adaptation and 
mitigation relative to these other environmental concerns. 
B. Climate Change as the Dominant Natural Resource Policy Paradigm 
The climate change paradigm followed the green paradigm and has 
been a direct response to the green paradigm’s limitations. Climate change 
is about more than just the impacts of changing climate patterns brought on 
by anthropogenic greenhouse gases: it is a paradigm aimed at integrating 
environmental protection with sustainable resource management.79 This 
paradigm is distinct from the green paradigm in many ways, particularly in 
its focus on adaptation and resiliency rather than establishing minimum 
standards of environmental quality.80 The climate change paradigm 
 
 76 But see Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust, supra note 75, at 46 (“Society is exhausting life-
sustaining natural resources at a pace that threatens the lives, comfort, and economic prosperity of 
individuals—not just future generations, but those living on Earth today.”); cf. Alice Kaswan, Greening 
the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1158–59 (2009) (predicting political opposition to the 
“green movement” in the case that it fails to “address social justice” concerns).  
 77 See Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust, supra note 75, at 54–55, 67–71 (advocating that, in 
the environmental context, the government function “as [t]rustee of [p]ublic [a]ssets for [p]resent and 
[f]uture [g]enerations,” and contrasting this public trust model with “the [f]ailed [p]aradigm of 
[e]nvironmental [l]aw” and its bloated “administrative state”). 
 78 See Scott M. Davidson, On Environmental Thought at the Turn of the Century, 42 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 433, 438 (2002) (reviewing JOHN MARTIN GILLROY, JUSTICE & NATURE: KANTIAN 
PHILOSOPHY, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE LAW (2000) (noting “the division of environmental 
regulation according to environmental media” with specific reference to air pollution (Clean Air Act) 
and water pollution (Clean Water Act))). 
 79 See, e.g., Anika E. Leerssen, Smart Growth and Green Building: An Effective Partnership to 
Significantly Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 287, 301–02 (2011) (noting, 
in the last decade, the emergence in federal policymaking of “smart growth” efforts “to reduce GHG 
[(greenhouse gas)] emissions in the U.S. transportation sector through integration of land use and 
transportation planning”). 
 80 See generally Carlarne, supra note 18 (discussing the need for integrating adaptive management 
principles as part of climate change policy); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural 
Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 367–70, 391–92 (2010) (discussing the 
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attempts to integrate broader concerns for intergenerational equity 
(sustainable resource management) with concerns of intragenerational 
equity (the disparate impacts that environmental contamination and 
resource depletion have on developing countries and economically 
disadvantaged communities).81 Climate change also prioritizes natural 
resource policies that promote both adaptation or resilience to changing 
climate patterns and mitigation of those impacts through the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions.82 Currently, policymakers frequently rely on 
carbon footprints to integrate these concerns.83 Carbon footprints, as a 
metric and policy tool, potentially integrate concerns of resource 
overexploitation, income inequities in resource allocation, deforestation, 
and sustainable development.84 
The climate change paradigm is led by hierarchists at the national or 
supranational level.85 Climate change is a problem of planetary scope, 
involving the entire atmosphere, oceans, mountains, forests, energy and 
food.86 In that light, climate change regulation is effectively the regulation 
of the global commons, and thus the paradigm’s leaders saw a cooperative 
international framework as the ideal approach.87 Such an approach arguably 
 
often-competing mitigation and adaptation policy approaches in environmental law and stating the need 
for increased focus on adaptation). 
 81 See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 117, 345 (1989) (quoting 
Edith Brown Weiss, Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity and International Law: An Introductory 
Note, 15 Climatic Change 327, 327 (1989)) (on intergenerational equity); Victor B. Flatt, Adapting 
Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
269, 289–91 (2012) (on intragenerational equity). 
 82 Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead” — Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for 
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 43–44 (2010). 
 83 Alessandro Galli et al., Integrating Ecological, Carbon and Water Footprint into a “Footprint 
Family” of Indicators: Definition and Role in Tracking Human Pressure on the Planet, 
16 ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS 100, 102 (2012) (“The Carbon Footprint measures the total amount of 
GHG emissions that are directly and indirectly caused by an activity or are accumulated over the life 
stages of a product.”); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change 
Governance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 224–25 (2010) (noting the use of 
the carbon footprint metric in establishing a threshold over which facilities must report carbon 
emissions). 
 84 See, e.g., Jody M. Endres, Agriculture at a Crossroads: Energy Biomass Standards and a New 
Sustainability Paradigm?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 530 (2011) (discussing how various agencies use 
the carbon footprint metric in the agricultural context); Galli et al., supra note 83, at 101–02 (discussing 
the importance of the carbon footprint as it relates to overall ecosystem sustainability). 
 85 See Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for 
Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 671–74 (2010) (“It is not surprising 
that scholars are skeptical of local governments’ ability to contribute meaningfully to greenhouse gas 
reductions. The very nature of climate change seems to render it incompatible with local control.”).  
 86 Eric W. Orts, Climate Contracts, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 199–202 (2011). 
 87 See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The 
Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 187–88 (2005) (“With respect to global environmental 
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requires a hierarchical, top-down approach within a supranational 
organization.88 Thus, given the sheer geographic scope of the challenge of 
mitigating anthropogenic climate change, and the inevitable spillover 
effects of greenhouse gas emissions, the movement began with intervention 
by the United Nations to cooperatively address climate change through an 
international framework convention.89 Unsurprisingly, given these global 
beginnings, the climate change paradigm pursues policies that embrace 
broader considerations than the green paradigm—including energy 
consumption and the differentiated responsibilities of developed nations 
compared to developing nations regarding resource protection.90  
Climate change became the dominant paradigm in part because a 
hierarchical, integrated approach can spread quickly, penetrating different 
industries, levels of government, and policy arenas. It benefited from top-
down regulation developed through political and scientific consensus with 
broad economic and geographic scope.91 Given the implications of global 
climate change, it arguably should dominate all other natural resource 
policy paradigms out of sheer necessity.92 Its scope and significance 
inevitably have resulted in debates about how best to characterize the 
paradigm and its goals, including the deployment of descriptive terms or 
goals such as sustainability, resilience, or adaptation.93 The challenges 
presented by climate change also include debates regarding issues of 
environmental justice, such as the role of human rights in environmental 
law and the disproportionate impact climate change has on economically 
 
problems such as global climate change or ozone depletion, the ‘matching principle’ calls for an 
international framework or response, as opposed to unilateral subglobal action.”). 
 88 See id.; see also Daniel Bodansky, International Law and the Design of a Climate Change 
Regime, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 201–04 (Urs Luterbacher & 
Detlef F. Sprinz eds., 2001) (describing the current model of international cooperation in climate 
change law). 
 89 See generally Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. 
Climate Change Regime, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 697 (2011) (describing the history behind U.N. efforts to 
address climate change). 
 90 Alexandre Genest, The Fight Against Global Warming: Progress Made and Priorities for a 
Successor to the Kyoto Protocol, 46 REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS 525, 574–75 (2012) (describing the 
different climate change responsibilities of developed and developing countries). 
 91 See Suh-Yong Chung, Is the Mediterranean Regional Cooperation Model Applicable to 
Northeast Asia?, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 363, 372 (1999) (“Generally, in the environmental 
cooperation field, scientific knowledge is critical in terms of defining issues and making policies. Its 
increasing role can bring national participation into international environmental cooperation negotiation 
efforts.”). 
 92 See Ross Astoria, Climate Hawks and California’s Carbon Offsets, 28 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
227, 229 (2013) (“Indeed, if we are to avoid catastrophic climate change, global warming policy must 
become the dominant form of governmentality.”). 
 93 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 82 (describing debates over prioritizing adaptation and resiliency 
over restoration or preservation). 
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and politically marginalized communities.94 While the debates around these 
goals and terms are important, for purposes of this Article, these debates 
fall within the broader climate change paradigm originally advocated by 
hierarchists, which focuses on responding to the consequences of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Typically, when scholars or 
policy advocates speak of resiliency or adaptation or environmental justice 
or sustainability, it is against the backdrop of climate change. 
While the climate change paradigm has replaced the green paradigm 
as the dominant paradigm in environmental and natural resource law and 
policy, its dominant position in the scholarly debate has not absolutely 
crowded out prior paradigms.95 Prior paradigms have not disappeared, and 
they continue to influence the current climate change paradigm.96 Both the 
industrial paradigm and the green paradigm persist and even affect the 
climate change paradigm itself. For example, market incentives and private 
governance approaches to address greenhouse gas emissions derive from 
the industrial paradigm’s entrepreneurial approach.97 Grassroots advocacy 
in climate change, Pigovian carbon taxes, and the view of greenhouse gas 
emissions as “pollution” to be regulated under command-and-control 
statutes like the Clean Air Act have their roots in the green paradigm.98 
 
 94 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for 
International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 77 (2005) (“[P]rovid[ing] a starting point 
for grappling with the complicated legal intersections at the heart of achieving greater environmental 
justice at an international level.”). 
 95 See, e.g., Carlarne, supra note 18, at 32 (discussing the broad proliferation of scholarship and 
policy proposals addressing climate change); Engel & Saleska, supra note 87, at 184–86 (noting the 
proliferation of efforts in civil society to address climate change impacts); Stephen M. Gardiner, A 
Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption, 
15 ENVTL. VALUES 397, 398 (2006) (noting the prominent role of ethical considerations in climate 
change discussions). 
 96 See, e.g., Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean 
Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 799, 800–01 (2008) (arguing that key parts of the Clean Air Act—representative of the green 
paradigm’s legacy—have continued use in “fill[ing] some of the gaps” that would be left by another 
environmental regulatory structure based on “carbon dioxide emission-trading programs”). 
 97 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate 
Change, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 57, 60–62 (2014) (proposing a strengthened transnational, private-
governance response to climate change); David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: 
Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 77–79 (2009) (proposing a new regulatory instrument 
relying on market incentives to address greenhouse gas emissions). 
 98 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a 
Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6–7 
(2009) (proposing a carbon tax); Shalanda H. Baker, Climate Change and International Economic Law, 
43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 73–74 (2016) (discussing environmental grassroots activists in El Salvador); 
Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by 
Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 643 
(2008) (referring to greenhouse gas emissions as “pollution”). 
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Additionally, it is necessary to point out that the climate change 
paradigm has not been entirely hierarchical. Climate change has a “multi-
scalar character,” wherein activists, entrepreneurs, and regulators function 
at different jurisdictional scales from the local to the supranational.99 As 
larger scale national and supranational jurisdictions leave niches unfilled in 
addressing climate change, smaller scale jurisdictions, such as municipal 
governments or river-basin commissions, may step in to fill these policy 
niches.100 These efforts of state and local governments in the U.S. to 
respond to greenhouse gas emissions are examples of nonhierarchical 
approaches to climate change.101 Still, these more localized approaches are 
responses to the limitation of the general hierarchical character of the 
climate change paradigm because policies are developed and implemented 
by those most familiar with the unique geographical and cultural 
characteristics of natural resources in a particular region. 
Climate change has not necessarily dominated policy discussions at all 
levels and in all instances, and vestiges of the green paradigm and 
industrial paradigm continue to dictate policy choices. There remain many, 
even in positions of influence, who are skeptical of climate change science 
and the importance of addressing climate change for future generations.102 
But amongst scholars and advocates within the natural resources and 
environmental policy spheres, climate change dominates the discourse, 
particularly if one accepts that debates about resiliency, sustainability, 
adaptation, and environmental justice are conducted within the context of 
climate change.103 The dominance of the climate change paradigm has 
facilitated critical advances in environmental and natural resource policy, 
including raising public awareness of the threat of global climate change, 
 
 99 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the 
“Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 363 (2011) (describing the key stakeholders in the process 
of regulating automobile greenhouse gas emissions); Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, 
supra note 19, at 591–93 (describing climate change as a multi-scalar problem). 
 100 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 926–31 (discussing the role of river-basin 
commissions in improving water management). 
 101 Freeman, supra note 99, at 362 (describing cooperation between the federal government and 
California in creating a program for regulating automobile greenhouse gas emissions); see also Garrick 
B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 948–51 (2011) (discussing the 
roles of local, state, and federal governments in regulating the renewable energy industry). 
 102 See, e.g., Lyle Scruggs & Salil Benegal, Declining Public Concern About Climate Change: Can 
We Blame the Great Recession?, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 505, 505 (2012) (noting a public “‘crisis 
of confidence’ in climate science”); John D. Sterman, Communicating Climate Change Risks in a 
Skeptical World, 108 CLIMATIC CHANGE 811, 812 (2011) (noting “widespread confusion, complacency 
and denial [about climate change] among policymakers, the media and the public”). 
 103 See Steven Burns, Environmental Policy and Politics: Trends in Public Debate, 23 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 8, 8 (2008) (“Climate change has come to dominate the public discourse on the 
environment unlike any other issue today.”). 
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reforming laws and regulations to better address anthropogenic greenhouse 
gases, increasing investment in adaptation and resiliency, encouraging 
greater focus on the disparate impacts of climate change upon the poor, and 
driving greater integration of environmental and natural resource issues 
under the rubric of carbon footprints and sustainable development.104 
However, as the following Section shows, the climate change paradigm 
cannot adequately address many of our more pressing environmental and 
natural resource concerns. 
C. The Inadequacy of the Climate Change Paradigm 
Despite improving on the green paradigm, the climate change 
paradigm is nevertheless incomplete, inadequately framed, and ultimately 
obsolete. The climate change paradigm fails to adequately address the 
primary concern of natural resource policy (increasing global demand for 
food, energy, and water) by focusing too much on greenhouse gas 
emissions and carbon footprints.105 Despite the strong science underlying 
anthropogenic climate change, there have been decades of public debate 
about the reality of the threat, its significance, and its salience.106 The 
climate change paradigm has sought to move past this debate through 
education or improved messaging.107 But perhaps it would have been better 
to abandon the debate as an expensive drag on progress by recognizing that 
 
 104 See Mary Jane Angelo & Joanna Reilly-Brown, Whole-System Agricultural Certification: Using 
Lessons Learned from LEED to Build a Resilient Agricultural System to Adapt to Climate Change, 
85 U. COLO. L. REV. 689, 694 (2014) (noting the increased emphasis on sustainability in the agriculture 
industry); Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: Climate Change 
Adaptation and Human Rights Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 309, 336 (2012) (discussing the increased 
sensitivity of vulnerable regions and communities to effects of climate change); Douglas A. Kysar, 
What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 (2011) (describing the ways in 
which tort law might positively address climate change, but also investigating the potential impact of 
climate change on tort law); J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity 
in Legal Systems — with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1373 (2011); 
Lisa Schenck, Climate Change “Crisis” – Struggling for Worldwide Collective Action, 19 COLO. J. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 346 (2008) (noting that although calls for “more immediate action” are 
lacking, “public awareness regarding climate change is increasing”). 
 105 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 952–53. 
 106 See generally Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Organized Climate Change Denial, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 144–60 (John S. Dryzek et al. eds., 2011) 
(discussing partisanship and other causes of ongoing debate over reality, significance, and relative costs 
and benefits of climate change and approaches to its mitigation); Dan M. Kahan et al., The Polarizing 
Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 732, 732–35 (2012) (discussing the role of science literacy on public engagement in, and 
perception of, debates on climate change risks). 
 107 See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Climate Change, Political Truth, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 
2012 UTAH L. REV. 545, 573 (2012); Matthew C. Nisbet, Communicating Climate Change: Why 
Frames Matter for Public Engagement, 51 ENV’T MAG. 12, 14–23 (2009). 
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the central issue in question—anthropogenic climate change—is not in fact 
the greatest or most pressing natural resource problem facing humanity. 
Indeed, though climate change is enormously important, it is ultimately an 
aggravating factor of a more fundamental and proximal concern and one 
with far less scientific uncertainty. By 2030, the planet will need 50% more 
food and energy and 30% more fresh water, regardless of climate change, 
as a result of population growth and increased consumption patterns.108 
Perhaps because it is a hierarchist paradigm, the climate change 
paradigm frames the discussion in terms inaccessible to, and remote from, 
most people.109 Advocates and scholars regularly assure the general public 
that there is a scientific consensus regarding climate change,110 but their 
message is built upon jargon-laden scholarly exchanges regarding complex 
mathematical models.111 That consensus is fundamentally about the role of 
human sources of greenhouse gas impacts and involves agreements over a 
range of possibilities and some inherent and acceptable degree of 
uncertainty.112 The message on climate change does not lend itself well to 
simple transmission to typical policymakers, voters, and consumers.113 
 
 108 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 109 Brooks E. Harlow & Roy W. Spencer, An Inconvenient Burden of Proof? CO2 Nuisance 
Plaintiffs Will Face Challenges in Meeting the Daubert Standard, 32 ENERGY L.J. 459, 462 (2011) 
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science underpinning the AGW [anthropogenic global warming] theory”); see also Michael P. 
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http://e360.yale.edu/assets/site/digest/ipcc-scientists-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/F33B-NCWA]. 
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 112  James M. Murphy et al., Quantification of Modelling Uncertainties in a Large Ensemble of 
Climate Change Simulations, 430 NATURE 430 (2004) (discussing the challenge of evaluating 
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CHILDREN, AND OUR GRANDCHILDREN 65, 69–75 (Joseph F. C. DiMento & Pamela Doughman eds., 
2007). 
 113 See Caleb W. Christopher, Success by a Thousand Cuts: The Use of Environmental Impact 
Assessment in Addressing Climate Change, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 549, 579 (2008); Lawrence C. Hamilton, 
Education, Politics and Opinions About Climate Change Evidence for Interaction Effects, 104 CLIMATE 
CHANGE 231, 235–42 (2011) (discussing the difficulties of effectively conveying risks of climate 
change to voters); Willett Kempton, Lay Perspectives on Global Climate Change, 1 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE 183, 183 (1991) (“[G]lobal climate change remains a challenge to lay comprehension. The 
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Attempts to make the research underlying climate change more 
accessible often oversimplifies, and the general public is left wondering 
how their local weatherman can continually be wrong about the next day’s 
weather but thousands of scientists can be so confident about the planet’s 
climate in the coming decades and centuries.114 Even in instances where the 
science is adequately conveyed, the relevance and significance is often lost 
on the general public.115 The initial framing of the challenge was often in 
terms of “global warming,” but this frame failed to raise concerns for many 
people busy shoveling snow from their driveways or for those who may not 
be terribly familiar with polar ice caps or glaciers.116 The pitch changed to 
“climate change” because global warming did not adequately describe a 
problem that was instead about increased extreme climate events and 
altered climate patterns.117 Though public awareness and understanding of 
climate change causes and impacts have increased since this reframing, 
efforts to mobilize both individuals and nations to respond to the threat 
have faltered.118 Framing the challenge in terms of either low-probability or 
temporally remote catastrophic events arguably generated apathy and 
created a wave of skeptics and deniers.119 
Moreover, the relatively narrow focus of the climate change paradigm 
inevitably fails to fully integrate critical considerations into natural 
resource policy decisions. For example, the paradigm’s narrow focus on 
carbon emissions neglects the other environmental costs associated with 
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new energy sources.120 Developments of nuclear or hydroelectric energy are 
low-carbon-emitting energy sources and may be necessary to meet rising 
energy demands, but their benefits may not ultimately justify their long-
term environmental costs.121 Similarly, solar energy requires extraction of 
natural resources like copper, which also may adversely impact the 
environment.122 While these new developments may be optimal for long-
term climate change, they may have other detrimental environmental 
effects. 
Additionally, regulators who seek to address climate change may not 
adequately consider the effects on the cost of food, water, and energy. For 
example, recent federal regulations impose more stringent emissions 
standards on coal-fired power plants,123 and producers may pass associated 
compliance costs on to consumers, thereby making energy more expensive. 
A critical example of this can be seen in the effect of strengthened 
emissions standards on populations that rely on these plants for water. The 
Navajo Generating Station (NGS), a coal-fired power plant, provides the 
necessary energy to bring Arizona’s allocation of Colorado River water 
through to the Central Arizona Project (CAP) canal system and to water 
users throughout the state.124 CAP is critical for delivering water to Native 
American tribes in Arizona who have settled their water rights claims to 
central Arizona rivers in exchange for the more reliable CAP water.125 
Tribes typically pay for the energy costs to transport the water through the 
CAP.126 Increased costs from more stringent emissions standards on NGS 
could make water provision through CAP unaffordable for some tribes, 
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effectively depriving the tribes of the water rights they agreed to in 
settlement.127 Thus, well-intentioned regulators narrowly focused on carbon 
emissions may inadvertently make water unaffordable for thousands of 
Native Americans in Arizona.128 
Defenders of the climate change paradigm may point to recent 
successes in moving the climate change agenda forward, including the 
commitments of major greenhouse gas emissions reductions under the Paris 
Accords.129 The agreed-upon reductions in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in the Conference of the Parties (COP) 21 
represent important progress in international cooperation in addressing 
climate change and one of the true success stories of the climate change 
paradigm.130 Indeed, the climate change paradigm has encouraged 
international cooperation to address a pressing global crisis. Nevertheless, 
the Paris Accords do not address the short-term natural resource 
challenges—the increased demand for water, food, and energy. Natural 
resource law and policy must move away from the narrow climate change 
paradigm and toward a new approach that integrates the broader and more 
pressing concerns of water, food, and energy demands. President Trump’s 
announcement regarding the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris 
Accords only further illustrates how a focus on the rhetoric of climate 
change may create some political obstacles that might be overcome by 
simply shifting the dialogue toward a different rhetoric131—perhaps the 
rhetoric of water security. 
This Article does not argue that the climate change paradigm is a 
failure or that it was unnecessary or counterproductive. Each natural 
resource paradigm has made important contributions and likely will endure 
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as part of the paradigm portfolio of natural resource law and policy in some 
form. However, though the climate change paradigm has played an 
important role, its limitations have inhibited mobilization. A new paradigm 
should now assume primacy in natural resource policy to address those 
limitations by integrating climate change concerns with increasing resource 
demands in a way that is relatable to the general public. 
II. WATER SECURITY: THE RISING PARADIGM 
Given the climate change paradigm’s limitations, a new paradigm is 
needed, one that is more integrated, accessible, and focused. One not 
characterized by the limitations and trajectories of past paradigms set by 
hierarchists, entrepreneurs, or ethicists but rather guided by regionalists 
who understand the unique characteristics of local watersheds. Water 
security should be the new preeminent paradigm in environmental and 
natural resource law and policy. Section A defines the water security 
paradigm and its scope and importance. Section B next explains why and 
how the water security paradigm should supplant the climate change 
paradigm, with the more accessible and integrated water footprint metric 
replacing the carbon footprint. Section C then describes governance under 
the water security paradigm, arguing that the water security paradigm 
should be led by regionalists focused on basin-level policy reforms and that 
jurisdictional boundaries should be redrawn, to the extent possible, to 
correspond to watersheds. 
A. Defining the Water Security Paradigm 
The water security paradigm reorients the goals of natural resource 
and environmental law and policy to achieve “an acceptable quantity and 
quality of water” with acceptable costs and risks.132 Water lies at the heart 
of human conflict and cooperation. Water security is the more integrated 
and accessible paradigm needed to address the limitations of the climate 
change paradigm and move natural resource law and policy forward. A 
water-based policy paradigm broadly integrates complex legal issues. 
Human civilization arose around desert river basins because survival 
in the desert required an unprecedented level of cooperation, specialization, 
and investment in public works to develop water resources.133 The inherent 
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challenge of developing and sharing a scarce resource like a desert river 
gave rise to the first complex political and legal systems to facilitate 
collaboration and resolve disputes.134 Indeed, “the word ‘rival’ [comes] 
from the Latin word ‘rivalis,’ meaning persons who live on opposite banks 
of a river.”135 Thus water lies at the heart of human conflict and cooperation 
and is, therefore, the foundational element not only of life but also of law. 
Given this elementary nature of water, water security underlies 
virtually every major societal problem. Drought and floods are obvious 
examples. In 2015, thousands of people were killed worldwide in flood 
events, with millions of people displaced and damage in the billions of 
dollars.136 Drought has plagued countries all over the world, with 
particularly disastrous impacts in Brazil, Venezuela, and the southwestern 
United States.137 The cost of the historic drought in California for 2015 
alone was $2.7 billion.138 
Beyond droughts and floods, many of the major violent conflicts 
around the globe have an important and underappreciated water 
component.139 It is not a coincidence that the rise of ISIS in Syria or the rise 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan occurred during historic droughts in these 
countries, which led to mass urbanization and higher food prices.140 
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32007967/ [https://perma.cc/HL8N-T883]. 
 139 See Larson, War and Water, supra note 23. 
 140 See David Arnold, Drought Called a Factor in Syria’s Uprising, VOA NEWS (Aug. 20, 2013, 
8:19 AM), http://www.voanews.com/a/drought-called-factor-in-syria-uprising/1733068.html 
[https://perma.cc/4UZC-E4XA]; Paula Hanasz, The Politics of Water Security in the Kabul River Basin, 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS INT’L (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/the-
politics-of-water-security-in-the-kabul-river-basin/ [https://perma.cc/AN4D-L5JZ]; Justin Worland, 
Why Climate Change and Terrorism Are Connected, TIME (Nov. 15, 2015), 
http://time.com/4113801/climate-change-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/4L42-5CGE]. 
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Desperate people in crowded cities without jobs and affordable food are 
like dry kindling for the spark of radicalization.141 
Similarly, water security has led to conflict between countries. Indian 
dam development on the Indus River has represented one of the most 
fraught issues in the ongoing, and sometimes violent, confrontations 
between India and Pakistan in the disputed Kashmir region.142 A battle cry 
for some in the region is: “[W]ater must flow, or blood must flow.”143 The 
Six Day War of 1967 between Israel and its Arab neighbors began in part 
as a water conflict, with competing attempts to divert the Jordan River 
resulting in several Israeli attacks.144 Even in the United States, water 
disputes between states over the Colorado River escalated to the point of a 
narrowly avoided civil war.145 
Similarly, many of the immigration and refugee challenges 
confronting the globe are merely examples of people doing what they have 
done for thousands of years: following water. Refugees from the conflict in 
Syria are perhaps the most obvious “water refugees” because, as noted 
above, the Syrian conflict was precipitated, and partly caused, by a drought 
in the Euphrates River basin.146 But even more fundamentally and broadly, 
humans move in search of water security. Modern human migration 
patterns reflect moves from water-insecure regions—often exemplified by 
limited reservoir storage capacity and thus limited drought and flood 
resiliency—to water-secure regions—exemplified by expansive reservoir 
capacity and thus high drought and flood resiliency.147 Even when migrants 
 
 141 See Hilal Khashan, The Curse of Underdevelopment and the Radicalization of the Arab City, 
17 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 7, 8, 12 (2010) (discussing the role of high food prices and limited economic 
opportunities in radicalization). 
 142 Nicole Livanos, Grab for Water Could Spark Conflict in Pakistan and India, 19 LOY. PUB. INT. 
L. REP. 24 (2013); Neal A. Kemkar, Note, Environmental Peacemaking: Ending Conflict Between India 
and Pakistan on the Siachen Glacier Through the Creation of a Transboundary Peace Park, 25 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 67, 75 (2006). 
 143 Unquenchable Thirst, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/21538687 [https://perma.cc/4PZV-WJ68]. 
 144 Donald Neff, Israel–Syria: Conflict at the Jordan River, 1949–1967, 23 J. PALESTINE STUD. 26, 
35–37 (1994). 
 145 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 917 (describing how Arizona marched 
National Guard troops against California construction crews building the Parker Dam on the Colorado 
River when those crews crossed into Arizona’s territory, and how violence was avoided when the U.S. 
Secretary of the Interior “halted construction of the dam in exchange for troops being recalled”). 
 146 John Wendle, Syria’s Climate Refugees, SCI. AM., Mar. 2016, at 50, 52–55. Of course, the 
Syrian conflict and resulting refugee crisis cannot adequately be explained by water insecurity alone—
there are a multitude of factors with complex interrelationships. But water insecurity is perhaps the least 
obvious, and therefore most underrated, aggravating factor. 
 147 See Grey & Sadoff, supra note 23, at 551–52, 558–59 (comparing the economic plight of water 
insecure countries with the “range of productive opportunities” that water provides in water-secure 
countries). 
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express their motivations as seeking peace, political stability, or economic 
opportunity, those attributes are partly functions of water security.148 
Hydrodiplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico are 
connected to immigration issues between the two nations, as limited water 
storage capacity in Mexico and salt-contaminated water reaching Mexico 
from the United States aggravate economic concerns, thus driving Mexican 
northern migration.149 As climate change causes ocean levels to rise, 
flooding and saline intrusion into freshwater aquifers will further aggravate 
the already critical global water-refugee crisis.150 
Additionally, water security is a critical prerequisite for achieving 
racial and gender equality. One of the primary indicators of gender 
inequality globally is a lack of educational opportunities for girls and 
young women.151 Women and children in developing countries spend up to 
six hours each day gathering water, making education and schooling 
difficult.152 Further, water provision frequently aggravates racial 
inequalities. Water provision, rates, and payment structures in many parts 
of the world have been implemented in ways that have disparate racial 
impacts.153 For example, in post-apartheid South Africa, the city of 
Johannesburg imposed requirements to prepay for water services on 
predominantly black communities, such as Phiri, whereas predominantly 
white townships could continue to purchase water based on credit.154 
 
 148 See generally Tom I. Romero, II, Bridging the Confluence of Water and Immigration Law, 
48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 779 (2016) (evaluating the role of water resource management in Mexican 
immigration to the U.S.). 
 149 See Jonathan S. King et al., Getting to the Right Side of the River: Lessons for Binational 
Cooperation on the Road to Minute 319, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 36, 63, 66–67, 82 (2014) 
(discussing the history of U.S.–Mexico relations on the Colorado River and the impact of river 
management on agriculture and immigration in northern Mexico). 
 150 Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and 
Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771, 818 (2011) (“Coastal areas will experience 
significant sea level rise, but will likely find their groundwater sources of drinking water contaminated 
from saltwater intrusion even before large amounts of coastal lands are lost to ocean levels.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 151 Naila Kabeer, Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: A Critical Analysis of the Third 
Millennium Development Goal, 13 GENDER & DEV. 13, 13, 16–18 (2010). 
 152 See David Hemson, ‘The Toughest of Chores’: Policy and Practice in Children Collecting 
Water in South Africa, 5 POL’Y FUTURES IN EDUC. 315, 317, 320 (2007) (reporting that for children in 
South Africa, this figure is around six hours per week); Michael R. Ulrich, The Impact of Law on the 
Right to Water and Adding Normative Change to the Global Agenda, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 43, 
69–70 (2015). 
 153 See generally Martha F. Davis, Let Justice Roll Down: A Case Study of the Legal Infrastructure 
for Water Equality and Affordability, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 355 (2016) (illustrating how 
recent drinking water problems in the U.S. reflect racial disparities and in some cases discrimination in 
the quality, affordability, and reliability of drinking water provision). 
 154 Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2253. 
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Similarly, the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, has clear racial 
implications.155 The majority of the residents of Flint are black, and the 
state’s “slow and often antagonistic response” to citizen complaints about 
water quality and the city’s reliance on dangerous, outdated infrastructure 
to deliver cheaper (and toxic) water, have raised claims of environmental 
racism behind the lead-poisoning crisis.156 
Water is also a major component of global health and the control of, 
and response to, pandemics.157 The deadly water crisis in Flint, Michigan, 
has, in addition to the threats of lead poisoning, included a spike in 
Legionnaires’ Disease.158 The still-ongoing cholera epidemic in Haiti, for 
example, had killed over 8,500 people and sickened over 600,000 as of 
December 31, 2013.159 It has been estimated that 2.3 billion people live in 
areas of “water stress”—defined by a per capita supply of 1,700 cubic 
meters per year; “almost 6,000 children under the age of five die every day 
from water[-]related diseases.”160 And, as I wrote previously: 
Officials throughout the Western Hemisphere are currently struggling to 
contain the growing Zika virus outbreak, spreading by mosquitoes [that breed 
in water] and resulting in serious birth defects and death . . . . The serious 
 
 155 Shea Diaz, Getting to the Root of Environmental Injustice, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. (2016), 
syndicated on ENVTL. L. REV. SYNDICATE, https://gelr.org/2016/01/29/getting-to-the-root-of-
environmental-injustice/ [https://perma.cc/PTW9-U5R8] (discussing the environmental justice issues 
associated with impacts of natural resource policies on vulnerable communities and racial  minorities in 
St. Joseph, Louisiana, and Flint, Michigan). 
 156 John Eligon, A Question of Environmental Racism in Flint, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/us/a-question-of-environmental-racism-in-flint.html 
[https://perma.cc/YF7W-GPPS]. There are many examples of environmental and natural resource 
policy implementation with disparate negative impacts on racial minorities in the U.S. See, e.g., David 
A. Dana & Deborah Tuerkheimer, After Flint: Environmental Justice as Equal Protection, 111 NW. U. 
L. REV. 879, 883 (2017). 
 157 For a discussion of the following recent water-based, waterborne, and water-related disease 
outbreaks, see Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1273–75. 
 158 Id. at 1274–75 (citing Matt Ford, A Legionnaires’ Disease Outbreak in Flint, ATLANTIC (Jan. 
13, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/flint-michigan-water-crisis/424062/ 
[https://perma.cc/7XWS-D7JQ]). 
 159 Enrico Bertuzzo et al., On the Probability of Extinction of the Haiti Cholera Epidemic, 
30 STOCHASTIC ENVTL. RES. & RISK ASSESSMENT 2043, 2043 (2016); see also Larson, Time of 
Cholera, supra note 35, at 1273. 
 160 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Human Right to Water, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 538 
(2007); see also Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1274. “Water scarcity” occurs where 
inadequate water quantity or quality prevents water supply from meeting demand during a period of 
time. See Water Scarcity, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.html [https://perma.cc/6HHG-PLHM]. 
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threat to human health posed by such diseases is likely to be aggravated by 
global climate change.161 
Given the vital role water plays in so many societal issues, the bounds 
of what can be called water law or water policy can be difficult to 
delineate.162 Water law thus can take on the “law of the horse” problem, 
where the scope of an area of law is defined so broadly that the definition is 
meaningless.163 For the purposes of this Article, however, water law and 
policy refers to the explicit governance of water rights and water quality, 
water delivery and treatment, and the management and mitigation of 
drought and flood. Such a definition does not represent the takeover of 
other policy spheres by water, nor does it seek to define all policy realms as 
essentially only a question of water. Water law and policy does not need to 
be defined broadly to address the broad impacts and implications of water 
security. A new paradigm that focuses on the expansive implications of 
water security, with water law and policy narrowly defined, would 
meaningfully advance sustainable and resilient natural resource and 
environmental policy, while also addressing issues of climate change, war, 
immigration, disease, and inequality. 
B. Why Water Security Should Replace Climate Change 
The water security paradigm described above should become the 
predominant paradigm because it addresses the two fundamental 
limitations of the current climate change paradigm. First, unlike the climate 
change paradigm, water security integrates the growing demand for food 
and energy, as the energy and agriculture sectors are our largest water 
consumers.164 Second, the water security paradigm improves upon the 
climate change paradigm by making sustainability issues more salient and 
accessible to the general public. 
 
 161 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1274–75 (footnote omitted). See generally Lisa 
Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. 445, 
447 (2008) (discussing the human health implications of climate change and suggesting that in the face 
of climate-induced famine from droughts and deaths from deadly floods, “[t]he weak[] [will] drop[] like 
flies” (citation omitted)). 
 162 See Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 937. 
 163 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 207 (1996) (arguing against the study of many areas of law impacting a certain industry or even 
object (such as a horse), rather than the study of general principles of law, because the former approach 
leads to a shallow understanding of essential principles of law). 
 164 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 950–51. 
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1. Virtual Water165 
Nearly everything humans do, for better and for worse, can be 
expressed in terms of quantity of water. Water is embedded in virtually all 
products, a concept called virtual water, with significant virtual water 
embedded in energy and food.166 The production of a single kilogram of 
wheat, for example, requires approximately 1,000 liters of water.167 Water 
is similarly embedded in energy, whether as a reactor coolant; steam to turn 
turbines; for growth of biofuel crops; in the mining of coal, oil, or natural 
gas; or in the components of solar and wind energy sources.168 
To complicate matters, virtual energy is similarly embedded in the 
treatment and distribution of water.169 If we move water security to the 
forefront in our discussions about sustainability, we will integrate climate 
change concerns with the problems associated with increasing global 
consumption patterns. That is because we will account for water throughout 
the chain of production in agriculture and energy.170 Of course, the 
monitoring and reporting of carbon footprints across the chain of food or 
energy production provides important information on climate change 
impacts from greenhouse gas emissions.171 The monitoring, measuring, and 
reporting of carbon footprints has thus become an important policy tool in 
assessing and mitigating anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, with the 
reduction of carbon footprints representing “the sine qua non of good 
environmental stewardship.”172 This focus on carbon footprints creates 
incentives to deploy low- or no-carbon energy sources, like nuclear, solar, 
wind, and hydroelectric energy. 
The climate change paradigm’s focus on greenhouse gas emissions 
and carbon footprints fails to account for environmental impacts from these 
 
 165 The following discussion of virtual water borrows heavily from my prior writing on the subject. 
See id. at 932–35, 952–55. 
 166 See Allan, Virtual Water, supra note 30, at 5–6. 
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 168 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 933. 
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 170 Id. at 954. 
 171 See Dave Owen, Climate Change and Environmental Assessment Law, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
57, 112–13 (2008). 
 172 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 952. 
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so-called “green” or “clean” energy sources.173 Carbon footprint 
measurements do not account for other environmental concerns associated 
with these low-carbon energy sources, because the production and 
transmission of energy affects water consumption and contamination.174 
The effects of extractive industries—coal mining, oil and gas exploration 
and extraction, and fracking, among others—on water security are not fully 
integrated in carbon footprint analysis.175 “Carbon footprints also fail to 
include the environmental impacts of climate change mitigation 
measures . . . .”176 For example, geologic carbon sequestration can cause 
groundwater pollution, while green building codes, smart grids, and hybrid 
cars can require higher uses of copper and other mined elements.177 
A jurisdiction could lower its carbon footprint by enacting such 
building codes, encouraging carbon sequestration, and developing 
renewable energy sources like wind, solar, and hydroelectric energy, all 
connected to a smart grid intended to lower energy demands.178 As I wrote 
before, “[t]hese efforts would likely significantly reduce the state’s carbon 
footprint,”179 and so they would advance the climate change paradigm. 
 At the same time, these activities require “the mining of silicon, 
copper, gold, tungsten, and other minerals to build the components of solar 
cells, wind turbines, ‘green’ buildings, hybrid cars, or smart grids.”180 
Carbon footprint analysis would not account for the increased water needed 
to cool the nuclear reactors, to grow the biofuels, to replace that lost to 
evaporation behind the dam, or to supply the fracking operations that 
recover natural gas.181 Neither would it account for the water pollution from 
 
 173 Id. at 952–53. 
 174 Id. at 952 (citing Alexis Laurent et al., Limitations of Carbon Footprint as Indicator of 
Environmental Sustainability, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4100, 4105–06 (2012)). 
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 178 For a similar but more detailed hypothetical, see Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 
953. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. For further discussion, see P.W. Gerbens-Leenes et al., The Water Footprint of Energy from 
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nuclear waste disposal, fracking, geologic sequestration, or hydroelectric 
dams.182 In short, the monitoring and reporting regime of the climate 
change paradigm is incomplete and provides an inadequate assessment of 
sustainable and environmentally responsible practices.183 
A water footprint is similar to a carbon footprint, in that just as a 
carbon footprint reflects carbon emissions associated with a product or 
activity, a water footprint reflects water consumption associated with a 
product or activity.184 A water footprint metric addresses fossil fuel energy 
production like a carbon footprint because it would account for the water 
used in that energy production.185 Water footprints would also integrate the 
impacts of pollution and water consumptions from across the entire chain 
of production of no- or low-carbon energy sources such as nuclear energy, 
hydroelectric, natural gas, biofuels, wind, and solar.186 Water footprints 
would also account for impacts to water quality from pollution.187 
Additionally, “water footprint[s] . . . provide necessary information on 
sustainability issues arising from increased consumption attributable to 
population growth and economic development.”188 
Furthermore, water footprints would provide a better understanding of 
how countries could face water insecurity through virtual water exports. 
Consider the following example: 
Fracking fluid frequently contains an emulsifier produced from the seed of the 
guar plant. The rapid [global] expansion of fracking . . . has resulted in a rising 
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groundwater contamination from nuclear waste); P.W. Gerbens-Leenes et al., supra note 181. 
 183 See Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 950–55. 
 184 See Lidija Čuček et al., A Review of Footprint Analysis Tools for Monitoring Impacts on 
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 186 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 952–55. 
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issues arising from increased consumption attributable to population growth and economic 
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112:139 (2017) Water Security 
173 
demand for guar, with the international price of guar seed rising from $4 per 
kilogram to $30 per kilogram in an eighteen-month period. Thousands of 
acres of crops formerly used for food production have been converted to the 
production of guar in India and Pakistan . . . . [G]uar may be a less drought-
resilient and more water-intensive crop than many of the food crops it 
replaces.189 
This replacement of food crops with increased guar production has the 
potential to raise food prices.190 
Guar production may facilitate a shift to cleaner natural gas in some 
nations with fracking operations but increase water insecurity in nations 
replacing food crops with guar.191 A shift to a water footprint metric will 
capture the impacts of these kinds of policies as virtual water moves around 
the world in global trade, determining “whether guar exports have the net 
effect of achieving water security in one nation at the expense of water 
security in another.”192 
2. Accessibility 
Psychological research suggests that as temporal and spatial distance 
increases, “mental representations become . . . more abstract” and mental 
prioritization less likely.193 In other words, people are unlikely to 
understand or prioritize sustainability issues unless they immediately hit 
home. That is especially problematic for climate change, as the general 
public often perceives climate change’s impacts to be uncertain, temporally 
and spatially attenuated, and “not personally relevant.”194 Even if citizens 
accept climate change as relevant and important, “it [still] must compete 
with other[, more salient] issues for priority.”195 
To more effectively convey sustainability concerns to the general 
public, these concerns must be framed in ways that are proximal in both 
time and space.196 And the message of climate change that hits most 
 
 189 Id. at 944–45 (footnotes omitted). 
 190 Id. at 945. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 955. 
 193 Leila Scannell & Robert Gifford, Personally Relevant Climate Change: The Role of Place 
Attachment and Local Versus Global Message Framing in Engagement, 45 ENV’T & BEHAV. 60, 62 
(2013). 
 194 Id. at 61. 
 195 Id. at 61–62. 
 196 Id. at 63; see also Anthony Leiserowitz, Communicating the Risks of Global Warming: 
American Risk Perceptions, Affective Images, and Interpretive Communities, in CREATING A CLIMATE 
FOR CHANGE: COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND FACILITATING SOCIAL CHANGE 44, 53–54 
(Susanne C. Moser & Lisa Dilling eds., 2007) (suggesting that in order to effectively communicate the 
risk of global warming, it is necessary to communicate that threats are local and immediate).  
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immediately and closest to home is a message of water variability and 
extreme weather events like droughts and floods.197 The water security 
paradigm speaks directly in these terms and, indeed, will reform laws to 
govern on the more local and regional level, rather than the hierarchical-
governance model of the climate change paradigm. Ultimately, any person 
can intuitively understand water waste and water pollution, and the 
challenge of water scarcity. But the concepts of carbon emissions, 
greenhouse gases, and their impacts on global climate patterns are far from 
intuitive, accessible, or even spatially and temporally proximal to most 
people. The water footprint metric focuses sustainability on the intuitive 
concept of water waste. Furthermore, a water footprint metric can be 
tailored to be understood and monitored within the specific geographic and 
cultural context in which it is used, by factoring in scarcity, cultural and 
recreational values, and ecological concerns. Climate change’s reliance on 
carbon footprints requires broader monitoring of sources and impacts 
divorced from geographic or cultural context. 
C. Governance Under the Water Security Paradigm198 
The shift from the climate change paradigm to the water security 
paradigm is in many ways about governance. Indeed, it addresses the 
“Goldilocks governance challenge”—governance must be scaled so that 
jurisdiction is neither too big nor too small.199 The scope of governance 
“must be just right to rein in transaction costs and limit externalities.”200 If 
the scope of jurisdiction is too big, there will be too many stakeholders who 
are too remote from one another and unfamiliar with local conditions, thus 
unnecessarily increasing transaction costs.201 If the scope of jurisdiction is 
 
 197 See Scannell & Gifford, supra note 193, at 63. 
 198 For a more detailed discussion of the role of appropriate jurisdictional boundaries in creating 
effective water policy, see Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, from which I have borrowed 
extensively for this Section. 
 199 Id. at 910–11. 
 200 Id. at 910 (citing R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (noting the 
relationship between transaction costs and externalities)); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental 
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 584–85 (1996); Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some 
Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1010–11 (2005)). 
 201 Id. at 910–11 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Robert 
D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010) (for a general discussion of the role of transaction costs on 
intergovernmental cooperation and federalism)). 
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too small, it will produce negative externalities to neighboring 
jurisdictions.202 Consider the following example: 
[I]f two [jurisdictions] share a river and the jurisdictional boundaries [do not 
correspond to the watershed], one [jurisdiction] can dam or pollute the river 
and externalize the costs of water scarcity or water contamination to its 
neighbor. If those [jurisdictions] share a river and the [boundaries incorporate 
many basins at a national or supra-national level], water management will be 
inefficient because stakeholders will be attenuated from management 
decisions and managers will be less familiar with the unique regional 
conditions associated with the river.203 
The Goldilocks governance challenge partially explains the failures of 
previous natural resource policy paradigms. The pollution occurring as a 
function of the industrial paradigm occurred in part because industries 
operated in, and were largely regulated by, one jurisdiction while 
externalizing the costs of contamination to downstream and downwind 
neighboring jurisdictions.204 Hierarchists continue to advance a top-down, 
global governance approach in the climate change paradigm, but this 
approach has advanced slowly in large part because the transaction costs of 
negotiating with so many diverse counties are simply too high.205 
As the previous section shows, both policies and messaging should 
take into account local considerations. Thus, determinations of the optimal 
quantity and quality should be made at the river-basin level, where unique 
cultural characteristics and physical conditions of each basin can be 
considered.206 The water security paradigm should not be led by 
entrepreneurs, ethicists, or hierarchists like previous natural resource policy 
paradigms.207 Top-down, hierarchical governance approaches are frequently 
ineffective because they depend on “thin simplifications” of complex 
systems.208 Though hierarchists encourage reliance on expertise and policy 
integration, they are too far removed from the locus of most actual policy 
implementation and thus frequently fail to understand how communities 
 
 202 Id. at 911 (citing Esty, supra note 200, at 601–02; Charles Fried, Federalism—Why Should We 
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 206 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 911–12. 
 207 See supra Section I.A. 
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organize themselves and respond to social problems.209 Entrepreneurs 
encourage development and investment but externalize costs. Ethicists 
encourage cost internalization and grassroots engagement but lack 
expertise and an integrated, holistic agenda. 
Rather, the water security paradigm should be led by regionalists—
advocates embedded within the river basin and familiar with the unique 
sociocultural, economic, hydrologic, and climatologic characteristics of 
that geographic unit, defined by the limits of the watershed.210 An 
illustration from my earlier work on jurisdiction may help clarify my 
meaning: 
For purposes of water management, the world is like a golf ball—a sphere 
pocked with dimples. Each dimple is a river basin, or catchment, and the 
boundaries between those dimples are watersheds. All water within a basin 
drains to a common point . . . . [and thus] . . . naturally internalizes the costs 
associated with water scarcity and quality.211 
The regionalist governance of water security, using water footprints as its 
tool for monitoring and measuring, would provide a more nuanced and 
understandable governance approach than the hierarchical climate change 
paradigm. 
With this regionalist approach in mind, the water security paradigm 
should be grounded geographically at the basin level for two reasons. First, 
those most familiar with the unique climate, geology, hydrology, economy, 
and culture of water should be those who advance the water security 
paradigm. The chemistry, ecology, and uses of water vary not only from 
one river to another but even between stretches of the same river.212 Water 
changes in its ecologic and economic character as it flows from mountains, 
valleys, deserts, and deltas and through farms, cities, and indigenous 
communities. Water also has an important cultural meaning that is distinct 
from other natural resources. No one playfully squirts oil or throws lumps 
of coal at each other, and you never hear of people being baptized in 
uranium. Water is different from other resources—not only because of its 
cultural, aesthetic, and religious significance—but because that significance 
changes as water flows through different communities, from one that sees 
the river as perennial, a source of fish, and sacred in highlands, and then 
 
 209 See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 924. 
 210 See id. 
 211 Id. at 911–12 (footnotes omitted). 
 212 K.J. Gregory, The Human Role in Changing River Channels, 79 GEOMORPHOLOGY 172, 175–
80 (2006); Luis Filipe Gomes Lopes et al., Hydrodynamics and Water Quality Modelling in a Regulated 
River Segment: Application on the Instream Flow Definition, 173 ECOLOGICAL MODELLING 197, 198–
201 (2004). 
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through another where the river flow is intermittent and largely a source of 
seasonal recreation. Regionalists are best situated to appreciate these 
nuances, because top-down planners will be unable to capture the dispersed 
knowledge of individual communities.213 
Second, water is a spillover common pool resource, meaning that it 
often crosses jurisdictional boundaries.214 Under the “internalization 
prescription” for spillover commons: 
[J]urisdiction [should] be assigned over spillover commons at the smallest 
scale that internalizes the effects of management decisions. In the case of 
spillover commons, jurisdictional boundaries must be redrawn, wherever 
possible, to conform to the geographic contours of the resource . . . . The 
watershed is thus the natural jurisdictional boundary, and the [drainage basin] 
the appropriate scale of jurisdiction . . . .215 
By basing governance boundaries on the watershed, the costs of water 
management will be internalized.216 Unfortunately, governance institutions 
have historically taken the opposite approach, using rivers as political 
boundaries to frustrating, and sometimes disastrous, results.217 
The water security paradigm’s focus on basin-level governance helps 
limit transactions costs by narrowing the field of stakeholders to those most 
familiar with and interested in the shared commons.218 Basin-level 
governance facilitates cost internalization and avoids negative externalities 
by redrawing jurisdictional boundaries to correspond to the geographic 
contours of the spillover commons—the basin.219 The water security 
paradigm’s focus on basin-level governance by regionalists thus strikes the 
right balance in the Goldilocks governance challenge by making the scope 
of jurisdiction just the right size to limit transaction costs while avoiding 
externalities.220 
 
 213 See generally F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945) 
(arguing that centralized top-down planning will not achieve the efficiencies of an open market in part 
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 214 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 910. 
 215 Id. at 911–12 (footnotes omitted). 
 216 See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 106–10 (2000) (explaining, but also 
criticizing, the “conventional economic prescription” that the best jurisdiction to provide spillover 
goods like water is a “special district” that “encompass[es] the natural region affected by pollution”). 
 217 See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 917 (discussing the example of the 
Colorado River as a boundary between three states creating long-term legal disputes over the shared 
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 218 Id. at 926–27. 
 219 See id. at 927–28; see also COOTER, supra note 216, at 105–07. 
 220 See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 927–28. 
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Of course, most jurisdictional boundaries do not correspond to the 
geographic contours of basins. Indeed, in 1868, explorer John Wesley 
Powell recommended to Congress that state boundaries in the western 
territories of the U.S. be based on river basins.221 Congress ignored his 
recommendations and, in some instances, even made the river itself the 
state boundary.222 Indeed, the great irony of Powell’s legacy is that, despite 
his revolutionary prescriptions regarding rivers, the reservoir that bears his 
name, Lake Powell, sits astride the Arizona–Utah border.223 And what has 
resulted has either been high transaction costs associated with federal 
control of water resources (such as with the Clean Water Act224) or the 
externalities associated with state control of water resources (such as water 
rights disputes over shared rivers).225 But sovereignty concerns make 
redrawing the boundaries to correspond to the basin politically problematic, 
if not impossible.226 Yet certain legal reforms can help to facilitate basin-
level, interjurisdictional governance. At the international level, river 
treaties often establish international river basin commissions.227 At the 
domestic level, in the United States, interstate compacts can establish 
interstate river basin commissions.228 
Often, these transboundary river commissions lack meaningful 
regulatory authority, or even sufficient resources to facilitate cooperation 
and information exchange, in part because member jurisdictions fear 
turning over sovereignty to the commission.229 To alleviate this concern, 
 
 221 Id. at 916–17; see generally J.W. POWELL, THE EXPLORATION OF THE COLORADO RIVER AND 
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2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 67, 79 (2012); Martin A. McCrory, Standing in the Ever-Changing 
Stream: The Clean Water Act, Article III Standing, and Post-Compliance Adjudication, 20 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 73, 77 (2001) (noting that ambiguity involving Clean Water Act jurisdiction has resulted in 
uncertainties that raise transaction costs associated with permitting projects that may discharge to 
jurisdictional waters). 
 225 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (illustrating the prolonged and complex 
litigation involved in interstate water disputes). 
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such commissions “should be subject to a judicially enforceable fiduciary 
duty” embodied in the organic instrument (whether compact or treaty) “to 
manage spillover commons for the benefit of all . . . jurisdictions” sharing 
the water.230 This would help avoid one jurisdiction co-opting the 
commission to its sole benefit and ensure adequate legal leverage for 
individual commission members to influence the commission and ensure 
that they have not sacrificed sovereignty, while still empowering the 
commission to avoid negative externalities and minimize transaction 
costs.231 Such leverage can be based on a disgorgement remedy for any 
breach of the commission’s fiduciary duty, as specified in the compact or 
treaty. Commission membership should also reflect the major industries, 
ethnic groups, utilities, and municipalities in the basin, thereby ensuring 
that transboundary commissions are led by regionalists in an effort to 
achieve water security.232 
Regionalists frequently have knowledge about social norms adapted 
over generations to unique regional conditions, including norms critical to 
natural resource development like cooperation and dispute resolution, that 
will not be captured by a hierarchist paradigm like climate change.233 Rivers 
like the Ganges or the Jordan have unique religious significance best 
understood by regionalists.234 Rivers with headwaters located in developed 
countries, like the Colorado River, may have more than a 1,000 days of 
reservoir storage to serve their populations, but 1,000 days of reservoir 
storage to serve the population relying on the Brahmaputra River would 
flood an area the size of Pakistan.235 Top-down, attenuated, supranational 
management tends toward the one-size-fits-all approach to governance, and 
that approach is inappropriate when rivers require solutions tailor-made to 
their unique geographies.236 Interstate compacts and regional international 
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treaties should effectively redraw jurisdictional boundaries to correspond to 
the geographic contours of river basins.237 Interbasin jurisdiction will be too 
remote from such adapted social norms, so treaties and compacts, granting 
basin-level jurisdiction to commissions, should redraw jurisdictional 
boundaries to empower regionalists. While political obstacles, in particular 
concerns of sovereignty, will be significant, these obstacles may erode in 
the face of the realities of water insecurity caused by growing populations, 
economic development, natural resources conflicts, plagues, and droughts 
and floods brought on by climate change. 
III. WATER SECURITY AND THE LAW 
A shift to the water security paradigm will have broad implications for 
natural resource law. As detailed above, the most obvious of these 
implications include the use of water footprints as a reporting and 
monitoring tool and the leadership of regionalists at the river basin level. 
These legal reforms will help ensure that the water security paradigm 
predominates. Other legal reforms will be essential to redirect natural 
resource policy toward achieving an acceptable quantity and quality of 
water at acceptable costs and risks. 
This Section proposes three legal reforms to advance global water 
security: (A) the recognition of a sustainable human right to water, (B) the 
integration of the Green Agenda (water quality) and the Blue Agenda 
(water supply) with what this Article calls the Red Agenda (disease vector 
habitat) in water law, and (C) the establishment of legal incentives for 
investment in water technology innovation and water infrastructure, 
including desalination and responsible dam development. These reforms 
not only will serve to advance water security but also would reflect legal 
innovations that are more likely to be implemented successfully under a 
water security paradigm than the current climate change paradigm. 
A. Recognizing a Sustainable Human Right to Water 
“There are only two kinds of people on earth—people with enough 
[clean] water to stay alive and dead people.”238 Water is often 
understandably referred to as a human right, and forty-one nations 
incorporate it as an express right in their constitutions.239 A growing chorus 
of voices has been calling for recognition of an international human right to 
 
 237 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32 (arguing for spillover commons to be regulated 
based on their geographic contours).  
 238 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 958. 
 239 Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2184. 
112:139 (2017) Water Security 
181 
water.240 In the United States, California has recently enacted its own 
“Human Right to Water Bill,”241 and water shutoffs in Detroit have 
increased calls to recognize the human right to water domestically.242 
Recognizing the right to water is an important part of advancing water 
security. The rhetorical force of recognizing a human right would raise the 
“lexical priority” of water issues and help to reorient policy toward the 
water security paradigm.243 An enforceable human right to water effectively 
puts first things first—what good are other rights to someone dying of 
cholera or thirst?244 Additionally, an enforceable human right provides legal 
leverage to disadvantaged or marginalized groups to secure environmental 
justice.245 However, the formulation of the human right to water, at the 
domestic and international levels, often leaves open for interpretation 
critical questions, including the amount, price, and proximity necessary to 
satisfy such a right.246 
Put simply, the right must be enforceable and not merely aspirational. 
If recognizing a right to water is to help achieve water security by more 
appropriately prioritizing water and providing leverage for disadvantaged 
communities to access this critical resource, then the right to water must be 
formulated and implemented in ways that are achievable, sustainable, and 
enforceable.247 It is insufficient to simply state that a human right to water 
guarantees provision of water of adequate quantity and quality to keep 
people alive. 
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For example, the Republic of Ecuador recognized the right to water 
under its constitution in 2008.248 Article 3 states that a prime duty of the 
government is to guarantee water for all citizens.249 Article 12 provides that 
the human right to water is fundamental and nonwaivable.250 Article 66 
provides that the right to drinking water is recognized and guaranteed to all 
people.251 And Article 318 states: “Water is a strategic national resource for 
public use and the State’s control over water is inalienable and non-
waivable, and water constitutes a vital element for nature and the existence 
of human beings. All forms of water privatization are prohibited.”252 
Despite the strong rhetoric, the constitutional right to water in Ecuador fails 
to clarify the quantity, quality, and price of water. Prohibitions on water 
privatization in Ecuador may limit the water sector’s access to credit and 
capital, making questions of water costs and pricing all the more difficult to 
answer. In part, because these questions typically remain unanswered when 
a constitutional right is formulated, such rights do not lead to better water 
provision.253 
India also has a “provision right” to water, one it has inferred from 
Article 21 of its Constitution.254 India’s Supreme Court has stated that “the 
right to access to clean drinking water is fundamental to life and there is a 
duty on the State under Article 21 to provide clean drinking water to its 
citizens.”255 Despite the recognition of this right, 17% of the population of 
India does not have access to tapped, treated water, including 38% of urban 
residents.256 
Clearly, when we speak of a human right to water we are talking not 
only about life but about a certain standard of living. That standard raises 
questions about cost, access, quality, and consistency of service making it 
necessary that a human right to water be accompanied by certain legal 
reforms to answer those questions. 
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One possible reform to make a right to water more easily enforceable 
is to reimagine the right to water as a “participation right” rather than a 
“provision right.”257 As shown by the constitution of Ecuador, a provision 
right would impose an obligation upon the state to provide water to its 
citizens and is the typical formulation of the right to water.258 In contrast, a 
participation right does not guarantee water provision but instead 
guarantees a citizen’s right to be free from discrimination or cruel treatment 
in water provision, to receive adequate notice of water cutoffs or rate 
increases, and to participate in the transparent development of water policy 
through stakeholder meetings.259 
Two court decisions in southern Africa illustrate the potential 
advantages of a participation right over a provision right in promoting 
water security. South Africa was one of the first countries to recognize a 
constitutional right to water and formulated it as a provision right.260 The 
right proved economically and ecologically unsustainable261 because South 
Africa implemented the right in a way that made cost recovery difficult.262 
Without effective water pricing, consumers had little incentive to conserve 
water, and water utilities would not invest in improving and maintaining 
infrastructure.263 Disputes over water pricing led to extensive litigation, 
with the South African Constitutional Court ultimately deferring to the 
water utility’s decision to require prepayment of water services beyond the 
provision of a free basic quantity of water.264 
In contrast, litigation in Botswana provides an example of how a 
participation right may be more easily enforceable.265 In the years prior to 
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the case in question, the Botswanan government had sought to remove the 
indigenous Basarwa community from a government-created game preserve 
in the Kalahari Desert.266 In an effort to force the Basarwa to leave, the 
government decommissioned the community’s wells.267 Ultimately, in a 
lawsuit brought by the community, the court restored the community’s 
rights based on a claim that depriving them of their water violated the 
community’s right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment under 
Section 7(1) of the Constitution of Botswana.268 Such a prohibition against 
government restraint on personal liberty falls within the meaning of a 
participation right because such a right is fundamentally about the freedom 
to engage in the political process without fear of state retaliation. 
The success of the Basarwa in Botswana in enforcing a participation 
right to water, compared to the failure to enforce a provision right in South 
Africa, suggests that the participation right may be a preferable formulation 
of the right to water.269 A participation right does not require water 
provision at low or no cost and thus does not raise the same sustainability 
concerns as a provision right. Additionally, participation rights tend to be 
more jurisprudentially mature than the relatively recent innovation of 
constitutional provision rights and thus more easily enforced in court.270 
Even if a state does seek to create and implement a provision right, 
certain reforms can ensure that such a right does not give rise to 
unsustainable water practices.271 First, courts with unique expertise in water 
law, science, and policy should adjudicate questions and disputes involving 
water law.272 One of the reasons the South African Constitutional Court 
upheld water cutoffs and prepaid rates was that the court lacked the 
institutional competency to evaluate the public water utility’s technical 
opinions on water sustainability and pricing.273 
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Second, jurisdictions should implement block rates for water pricing 
with directed subsidies—in the form of “water stamps”—provided to poor 
households that cannot afford to pay the full cost of basic water 
provision.274 With block rates, a basic amount of water for domestic use 
would be priced well below cost.275 With each additional block of water 
consumed, the rate increases so that the largest water consumers (energy 
and agriculture, typically) pay the highest rates, higher than the full cost of 
provision.276 Those higher rates would encourage water conservation in the 
industries best placed to achieve water savings.277 Those higher rates would 
then be used to subsidize water stamps. Poor individuals or families would 
pay what they could for their basic water block, based on an “ability-to-pay 
determination” made by the municipal government, with the difference 
made up by water stamps.278 In this way, everyone pays for water and 
internalizes the costs of water consumption, but economically 
disadvantaged people have those costs partially offset by direct subsidies 
funded by rates paid by the largest water consumers.279 
The danger in this approach is that the cost of higher water rates will 
be passed on to poor communities through higher food and energy prices.280 
Additional support would be necessary to ensure a minimum standard of 
living, including directed food subsidies to economically disadvantaged 
households and electricity rates at the household level set at affordable 
rates in poorer communities. Despite the challenge in implementing block 
rates, prioritizing equitable and sustainable water provision represents a 
potential starting point and an emphasis that would move the world toward 
water security.281 
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Environment for Development Initiative) ((2000), http://www.efdinitiative.org/sites/default/files/
071f_water20tariff20design.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH2M-AMPJ] (criticizing the use of block tariff 
regimes in developing countries). 
 276 Larson, Adapting Human Rights, supra note 33, at 41. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at 42. 
 279 Id. at 42–43. 
 280 Id. at 43 (“The embedded nature of water and energy – virtual water and virtual energy – 
make[s] it difficult to establish equitable pricing of these utility services [and food] without any 
increased block rates being reflected in the costs of other goods and services.”). 
 281 Id. 
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B. Integrating Public Health Concerns into Water Law282 
Perhaps no element of water policy threatens security more than the 
potential for water-related disease outbreaks. As noted above, water 
represents both a pathway of transmission and a critical component in 
prevention of pathogens.283 One of the most important ways in which the 
connection between water and disease has been framed is in the 
classification of diseases by how they are transmitted through water—a 
system called the Bradley Classifications in epidemiology.284 The system 
classifies a host of various diseases into four categories based on mode of 
transmission.285 
In my previous work, I have described the importance of the Bradley 
Classification system in illustrating the importance of water management in 
the prevention and mitigation of disease outbreaks and noted how the 
classification system demonstrates the sheer number of major diseases 
associated with water management.286 The first class includes waterborne 
infections, such as cholera or typhoid, which are transmitted directly 
through ingestion of water tainted with the disease-causing microbial 
pathogen.287 These diseases can be prevented through improved sanitation 
infrastructure to prevent fecal contamination and improved treatment of 
drinking water, including disinfection by chlorine or ultraviolet light.288 The 
second class includes water-washed infections, such as trachoma or 
scabies, which arise because of inadequate water for hygiene.289 Indeed, one 
 
 282 For a lengthy discussion of the need for integration of the Blue, Green, and Red Agendas, see 
Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, from which the following Section borrows extensively. 
 283 Id. at 1274; see also supra Section II.A. 
 284 See also C.L. Moe, What are the Criteria for Determining Whether a Disease Is Zoonotic and 
Water Related?, in WATERBORNE ZOONOSES: IDENTIFICATION, CAUSES AND CONTROL 27, 31–34 (J.A. 
Cotruvo et al. eds., 2004) (summarizing the Bradley Classifications and providing examples and 
background for each category). See generally GILBERT F. WHITE ET AL., DRAWERS OF WATER: 
DOMESTIC WATER USE IN EAST AFRICA (1972) (a longitudinal study of water use in Ugandan villages 
that represents the initial research upon which the Bradley Classifications are based and the earliest 
articulation of the classifications). 
 285 Moe, supra note 284, at 31–34; see also D. D. Mara & R. G. A. Feachem, Water- and Excreta-
Related Diseases: Unitary Environmental Classification, 125 J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING 334, 334 (1999) 
(providing a table summary of the Bradley Classifications). 
 286 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1291–96. 
 287 Moe, supra note 284, at 32. 
 288 See, e.g., Thomas Clasen et al., Microbiological Effectiveness and Cost of Disinfecting Water by 
Boiling in Semi-Urban India, 79 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 407, 407 (2008); J.V. Pinfold, 
Faecal Contamination of Water and Fingertip-Rinses as a Method for Evaluating the Effect of Low-
Cost Water Supply and Sanitation Activities on Faeco-Oral Disease Transmission. I. A Case Study in 
Rural North-East Thailand, 105 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION 363, 374 (1990); Mark A. Shannon et al., 
Science and Technology for Water Purification in the Coming Decades, 452 NATURE 301, 302 (2008). 
 289 Mara & Feachem, supra note 285, at 334–35. 
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of the keys to long-term control of water-related diseases is simply 
ensuring a sufficient quantity and quality of water to allow for basic 
hygiene.290 The third class includes water-based infections such as guinea 
worm and schistosomiasis, where the pathogen spends part of its life inside 
vectors whose primary habitat is aquatic, such as snails or water fleas.291 
The fourth class includes water-related infections where the disease vector 
breeds in water, such as mosquitoes, but the diseases spread via other 
means, such as insect bites.292 These water-related infections include 
malaria, Zika, West Nile virus, Dengue fever, yellow fever, and 
chikungunya.293 They collectively represent one of the greatest threats to 
human life,294 with malaria alone killing an estimated 584,000 people in 
2013.295 
Despite the significant role water plays in epidemiology, water law 
itself often fails to address public health concerns.296 The Red, Green, and 
Blue Agendas of water law interact in many ways. Water law typically 
focuses on the Blue Agenda and the Green Agenda but fails to fully 
integrate the Red Agenda.297 The water security paradigm must more fully 
integrate the Red Agenda in water law and policy.298 The Venn diagram 
below, drawn from my previous work, provides an illustration upon which 
a discussion of these interactions can be based. 
  
 
 290 See id. at 338. 
 291 Moe, supra note 284, at 32–33; see also Bruno Gryseels et al., Human Schistosomiasis, 
368 LANCET 1106, 1113 (2006) (reporting that schistosomiasis affects 200 million people worldwide, 
with as many as 280,000 deaths annually in sub-Saharan Africa alone). 
 292 Mara & Feachem, supra note 285, at 335. 
 293 Id. at 336 (noting malaria and Dengue fever as examples); Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 
35, at 1295. 
 294 Duane J. Gubler, Resurgent Vector-Borne Diseases as a Global Health Problem, 4 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 442 (1998) (noting the severity and scope of water-related disease epidemics); 
Atul A. Khasnis & Mary D. Nettleman, Global Warming and Infectious Disease, 36 ARCHIVES MED. 
RES. 689 (2005) (noting the potential for increased mortality rates associated with water-related 
diseases expanding as a result of climate change). 
 295 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2014, at 38 (2014), http://www.who.int/ 
malaria/publications/world_malaria_report_2014/wmr-2014-no-profiles.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5T8-
XSBJ]. 
 296 See Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1291–98. 
 297 Id. at 1276. 
 298 Id. at 1290. 
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Figure 1: Venn Diagram of the Three Water Law Agendas299 
 
 
I have previously described this diagram as follows: 
[I]n Area A of the diagram, all three agendas are integrated. An example of a 
water law that integrates all three agendas might include legal incentives for 
water efficiency, like . . . minimum water efficiencies for appliances. In that 
case, more water is available for the environment to protect aquatic habitat 
and to dilute pollution, thus advancing the Green Agenda. More water is 
available for [human use], thus advancing the Blue Agenda. And more water 
is available for hygiene and sanitation, thus preventing water-washed and 
waterborne diseases and advancing the Red Agenda.300 
 Unfortunately, water law and policy is frequently implemented in 
ways where these agendas conflict or are ignored. For example, a nation 
may invest in building dams, reservoirs, and irrigation systems in the name 
of advancing the Blue Agenda, but by doing so, it brings disease vector 
habitats closer to human communities.301 Or a nation may prohibit the 
discharge of pesticides in rivers and lakes to protect water quality in the 
name of the Green Agenda, but that would make it more difficult to 
 
 299 Id. at 1298. 
 300 Id. at 1298–99. 
 301 S. Sow et al., Water-Related Disease Patterns Before and After the Construction of the Diama 
Dam in Northern Senegal, 96 ANNALS TROPICAL MED. & PARASITOLOGY 575, 579 (2002) (describing 
the rise of malaria and schistosomiasis in the wake of the construction of the Diama Dam and related 
infrastructure in Senegal). 
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respond to disease outbreaks because pesticides help to kill disease vectors 
like mosquito larvae.302 
As I have written elsewhere, “[t]he . . . water crisis in Flint, Michigan, 
can [also] be better understood through this [diagram’s] framework.”303 To 
address water supply issues, “Flint ceased purchasing water from Detroit 
and instead shifted its primary water source to the [less costly] Flint 
River.”304 This shift to a closer and cheaper water supply is textbook Blue 
Agenda thinking, but it resulted in a major public health crisis, including 
lead contamination and an outbreak of the waterborne Legionnaires’ 
Disease.305 Had water planners integrated the Red and Green Agendas into 
their analysis, they may have considered the potential for waterborne 
pathogen outbreaks and chloride contamination of the river that resulted in 
lead leaching from pipes.306 
The fundamental importance of the three-agendas framework is to 
encourage an integrated water policy to achieve water security. Integrating 
the Red Agenda advances water security by mitigating the costs and risks 
associated with water disease epidemics. But current water law fails to 
integrate the Red Agenda due to the siloed thinking of water rights and 
water quality lawyers, who work in a vacuum and do not frequently interact 
or collaborate with public health professionals.307 Certain legal reforms, 
such as requiring Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) in connection with 
water resource development projects, could help to better integrate the Red 
Agenda into water and policy.308 An HIA would be similar to the 
 
 302 Nat’l Cotton Council v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 940 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that discharge of 
pesticides into rivers and lakes required a Clean Water Act permit). 
 303 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35 at 1299. Specifically, I argued that “[t]he crisis in Flint 
is arguably an example of pure Blue thinking, lodged in Area F . . . and failing to adequately integrate 
the other agendas.” Id. at 1300. 
 304 Id. at 1299. 
 305 Id.; see also Suzannah Gonzales, Legionnaires’ Spike in Michigan County Dealing with Water 
Crisis, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2016, 5:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-michigan-water-
idUSKCN0UR23120160113 [https://perma.cc/5KNG-4PUK]). 
 306 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1299; see also Stephen Rodrick, Who Poisoned 
Flint, Michigan?, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/who-
poisoned-flint-michigan-20160122 [https://perma.cc/LZ7R-GAHK]). 
 307 See Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1311–13; see also Robert L. Glicksman & 
Richard E. Levy, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 511–15 (2011) (describing costs 
associated with the silo effect in agency rulemaking and adjudication, and the efforts of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the U.S. federal government to overcome silo effects). 
 308 See Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1315–16; see also, e.g., Health Impact 
Assessment: Main Concepts and Suggested Approach (European Ctr. for Health Policy, Gothenburg 
Consensus Paper, 1999), http://www.healthedpartners.org/ceu/hia/hia01/ 
01_02_gothenburg_paper_on_hia_1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY3F-NYU6] [hereinafter Gothenburg 
Consensus] (describing approaches for the effective implementation of health impact assessments). 
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Environmental Impact Statements prepared under the National 
Environmental Protection Act, under which projects undertaken, permitted, 
or funded by the U.S. federal government are required to evaluate 
environmental impacts and potential alternatives that could avoid those 
impacts.309 The approach of the HIA policy would be similar, under which 
legislation, treaties, or the internal rules of international development banks 
would require the evaluation of the impacts of a water development project 
on disease vector habitat and the possible alternatives to avoid any public 
health challenges associated with such water projects. 
Some have criticized assessment requirements as “toothless 
procedural hoops with little to no [substantive] impact.”310 This need not be 
so, however. These procedural requirements can have substantive 
components when agencies and collaborating organizations agree to 
enforceable obligations incorporated into the assessment process.311 
Further, requiring assessments can improve project planning through 
mandatory consideration of public health concerns that may otherwise be 
ignored, and the public release of the assessment report would improve 
transparency.312 These assessments and the potential for associated 
substantive requirements would integrate the Red Agenda into water law 
and policy and move that policy closer to achieving water security. 
C. Encouraging Investment in Water Innovation and Infrastructure 
The reforms I have proposed thus far will advance global water 
security. However, additional reforms are necessary to encourage greater 
investment in the technology and infrastructure. Billions of dollars are 
needed globally simply to maintain existing water infrastructure.313 Leaking 
pipes have resulted in wasted water all over the world, without recovery of 
 
 309 See, e.g., Gothenburg Consensus, supra note 308 (setting forth recommendations for conducting 
health impact assessments and comparing them to environmental impact assessments); Andrew L. 
Dannenberg et al., Growing the Field of Health Impact Assessment in the United States: An Agenda for 
Research and Practice, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 262 (2006). 
 310 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1316 & n.312 (cataloging examples of such 
scholarly critiques). 
 311 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1131, 1164 (2012) (noting how agreements within the NEPA Record of Decision may impose 
substantive requirements on agencies and regulated parties). 
 312 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1316; see also Michael LeVine et al., What About 
BOEM? The Need to Reform the Regulations Governing Offshore Oil and Gas Planning and Leasing, 
31 ALASKA L. REV. 231, 245 n.74 (2014). 
 313 See, e.g., Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning, 
and the Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 130 (2013) (“For example, over 
the next twenty to thirty years, it is estimated that the United States will need to invest $140–250 billion 
in water infrastructure.”); Camille Pannu, Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from 
California’s Central Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223, 268 & n.235 (2012). 
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costs.314 Investments and innovations in irrigation technology and more 
efficient industrial and domestic appliances and equipment are critical to 
improved water conservation.315 In some parts of the world, conservation 
alone will be inadequate, and water augmentation technology, such as 
cloud seeding or desalination, may be required.316 And in many instances, 
greater investment in dams is necessary to increase flood and drought 
resiliency by capturing flood waters and by increasing storage capacity.317 
1. Shared Benefits 
“The concept of shared benefits is derived from welfare economics, 
noting that water is a . . . commodity with [variable accessibility and] 
multiple possible alternative uses . . . .”318 Under this concept, the most 
access to and effective use of water often depends on geography.319 To 
facilitate development of dams, the concept of shared benefits should be 
recognized as a binding principle of domestic and international water 
law.320 As I have noted previously, though “[e]ach [riparian] jurisdiction 
could attempt to capture the full panoply of [potential] water uses , . . . that 
would mean inefficient attempts to implement uses [of water in ways] that 
may be a poor geographic or economic fit.”321 Rather than attempt to share 
the raw water of the river, jurisdictions should share all of the benefits of 
that water use based on their comparative geographic and economic 
advantages. 
For example, an upstream mountainous jurisdiction should develop 
dams and share the benefits of storage, flood control, and hydroelectricity 
with a lowland, downstream jurisdiction with greater capacity to grow 
 
 314 See Andrew F. Colombo & Bryan W. Karney, Energy and Costs of Leaky Pipes: Toward 
Comprehensive Picture, 128 J. WATER RESOURCES PLANNING & MGMT. 441, 441 (2002) (“That leaks 
are costly in terms of money and resources is a well-established idea . . . . Leakage is the dominant 
component of UFW [unaccounted for water].”). 
 315 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States: Human 
Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 785, 
844–45 (2009); Ronald A. Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and 
Legal Analysis, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181, 194 (1996). 
 316 See Larson, Augmented Water Law, supra note 227, at 773–78. 
 317 See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 957–58. 
 318 Id. at 957. 
 319 Id. 
 320 A. Dan Tarlock & Patricia Wouters, Are Shared Benefits of International Waters an Equitable 
Apportionment?, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, 523, 533 (2007) (citing Claudia W. Sadoff & 
David Grey, Beyond the River: The Benefits of Cooperation on International Rivers, 4 WATER POL’Y 
389 (2002)). 
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food. The benefits of the food in turn can be shared with its upstream 
neighbor.322 
The 1961 Columbia River Treaty illustrates how a shared-benefits 
regime can be implemented.323 The treaty allows Canada and the U.S. to 
manage the river cooperatively, with Canada developing flood-control 
measures and the U.S. providing storage and hydroelectric energy.324 
Shared-benefits governance is not a concept limited only to dam 
development because it can be applied in other water infrastructure 
contexts. The Arizona Water Banking Authority (AWBA) in the Colorado 
River basin uses a shared-benefits approach for groundwater 
management.325 “Arizona created the AWBA in 1996 as a means of storing 
[part of] Arizona’s unused allocation of Colorado River water”326 through 
artificial groundwater-recharge facilities,327 which Arizona’s geology 
permits.328 Arizona expanded its use of the AWBA and now also stores 
Colorado River water for Nevada, which pays for the storage.329 Arizona 
thus makes use of its comparative geographic and geologic advantage and 
shares the benefits of that use with its coriparian state, thereby monetizing 
water efficiency.330 As this example shows, “[b]enefit sharing need not be 
limited solely to water quantity.”331 
2. Technology Investments 
Additional reforms can facilitate investment in water conservation 
technologies. For example, in the western United States, prior-
appropriation water rights regimes typically include the concept of 
forfeiture—a “use it or lose it” rule where a water rights holder forfeits its 
water right if it fails to use the water for a period of time.332 The doctrine of 
forfeiture discourages implementation of water-efficient irrigation 
technology like center-pivot or drip irrigation. Even if a farmer could get 
the same productivity out of less water, the farmer will use the same 
 
 322 Id. at 914. 
 323 Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River 
Basin, Can.–U.S., Sep. 16, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1555. 
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49 ARIZ. L. REV. 209, 213 (2007). 
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 329 Id. 
 330 Id. 
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 332 See, e.g., John C. Peck & Constance Crittenden Owen, Loss of Kansas Water Rights for Non-
Use, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 801, 802 (1995). 
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amount of water to avoid forfeiture.333 States could implement water 
escrows, where water users could place unused water rights achieved 
through conservation into trust with the state.334 While held in trust, those 
rights would be shielded from forfeiture.335 The trust could then act as a 
clearinghouse for the sale of water rights achieved through conservation 
and connect potential sellers with potential buyers.336 In some instances, 
where financing is needed to implement water conservation technology, 
lenders could make loans secured by the rights to the conserved water. This 
would allow farmers and developers to access credit needed to invest in 
water conservation technologies, and for financiers to encourage the use of 
the most advanced and efficient water appliances and irrigation methods. 
Other reforms can facilitate the necessary investment in water 
augmentation technology.337 Water law in the western United States, for 
example, distinguishes between developed water and salvaged water.338 
Developed water—such as desalinated sea water or bulk water imports—is 
imported into the basin  by tanker or pipeline.339 Salvaged water is part of 
the basin but made accessible by technological means, such as drilling for 
and desalinating otherwise inaccessible and brackish groundwater or 
removing invasive scrub brush for forests to increase stream flow.340 
Developed water lies outside the scope of the state’s water rights regime 
and is owned by the developing party.341 In contrast, salvaged water 
remains part of the water rights regime, with the salvaging party having no 
right to the augmented water created.342 In the water escrow example from 
above, a portion of the water moving through the escrow could be held 
back from each transaction to build up a fund of available water rights.343 
 
 333 See Dan Tarlock, How Well Can Water Law Adapt to the Potential Stresses of Global Climate 
Change?, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 24 (2010). 
 334 Rhett Larson & Kelly Kennedy, Bankrupt Rivers, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1335, 1378 (2016). 
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 337 See Rhett B. Larson, Innovation and International Commons: The Case of Desalination Under 
International Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 759, 764–67 (2012); Larson, Augmented Water Law, supra note 
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augmentation technologies). 
 338 Larson, Augmented Water Law, supra note 227, at 766–67. 
 339 Id. at 766. 
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 341 Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1324–25 (Colo. 
1974) (holding that a party that invested in the removal of invasive species along a river—resulting in 
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 342 Id. 
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These water rights could create a discounted source of water rights 
available to those who invest in salvaged water technologies or processes, 
such as desalination, forestry management practices, or arguably even 
cloud seeding.344 Access to discounted water rights markets would create 
incentives that do not currently exist in water law for parties to invest in 
water augmentation, at least in the context of salvaged water.345 
IV. THE PROMISE AND CHALLENGES OF THE WATER SECURITY PARADIGM 
Two related ideas lie at the very heart of a water security paradigm 
and are illustrated in a statement made by Bruce Lee regarding his theory 
of martial arts: “Be formless, shapeless, like water. You put water into a 
cup, it becomes the cup. You put water into a bottle, it becomes the bottle. 
Water can flow or it can crash. Be water, my friend.”346 
The two ideas contained in Lee’s theory of martial arts represent the 
core related ideas of water security jurisprudence. First, adaptive capacity 
is essential in laws and policies formulated under the water security 
paradigm. Water laws must be like water: they must be effectively adapted 
to respond to changing circumstances.347 Second, natural resource laws and 
policies must no longer seek to manage a “normal” natural system; instead 
they must recognize that these systems both flow and crash—they are 
creative and destructive. This is perhaps the most important contribution of 
the climate change paradigm—that there is no “normal” in natural 
resources. This must inform the water security paradigm. Natural resource 
policies should depend upon data, models, and assumptions regarding 
water extremes like droughts, floods, epidemics, and water conflicts.348 
Laws and policies should seek to manage those extremes rather than seek 
to achieve some illusion of the “normal” status of water quality and 
quantity. The natural world changes, new technologies evolve, populations 
grow, and consumption patterns alter according to economic conditions. 
Laws must be able to adapt to manage the extreme conditions brought on 
by these dynamic systems. 
Laws must, therefore, integrate an “adaptive management” approach. 
Adaptive management is “a systematic process for continually improving 
management policies and practices by learning from the outcomes of 
 
 344 Id. at 1378. 
 345 Id. 
 346 BRUCE LEE, WORDS FROM A MASTER (John R. Little ed., 1999). 
 347 For a general discussion of adaptive management in natural resource law, see J.B. Ruhl & 
Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424 (2010). 
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implemented management strategies.”349 Because the ability to predict 
future events is inherently limited, legal institutions must periodically 
evaluate management decisions and adapt to respond to new information or 
changing circumstances or else develop a system that automatically 
responds to changing conditions. Water rights regimes should thus allocate 
rights based on a percentage of available stream flow rather than a raw 
quantity of water.350 Such a regime automatically adapts to available 
resources and avoids the conflicts associated with rigid raw water 
allocations. 
The advantages of an adaptive approach can be seen by comparing the 
approaches of the upper basin states of the Colorado River basin (which 
allocate water based on percentage of available flows) and those of the 
lower basin states (which allocate based on raw water amounts).351 The 
lower basin states—Arizona, Nevada, and California—deal with this 
perpetual problem because the allocations established by law have a built-
in structural deficit.352 The Colorado River Compact allocates 7.5 million 
acre-feet per year to the upper basin states and 7.5 million acre-feet per 
year to the lower basin states.353 The 1944 Rivers Treaty with Mexico 
allocated 1.5 million acre-feet per year to Mexico.354 And the system loses 
1.5 million acre-feet each year to evapotranspiration. That adds up to an 
assumed 18 million acre-feet available in the river system each year. But 
tree ring analysis demonstrates that the river more typically contains 
around 13.5 million acre-feet per year.355 The upper basin allocates its 7.5 
million acre-feet based on a percentage of available stream flow, thereby 
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accounting automatically for the structural deficit and adapting to the ever-
changing conditions of the river.356 The lower basin, on the other hand, 
allocates raw water amounts to each state and is in a perpetual state of 
negotiation over how to respond to the shortage. This rigid system cannot 
survive as an effective means of water allocation in a dynamic world.357 
Water security requires adaption to water reality and resilience to water 
extremes. 
Adaptive management has become a central feature of climate change 
policy debates,358 as policymakers must respond to changing climatic 
conditions and ever-improving climate modeling.359 The question of 
sustainable development encompasses not just maintaining and improving 
human life but also maintaining and improving human life under changing 
environmental and technological conditions. As such, natural resource law 
needs to “do development differently” through adaptive management.360 
However, technology and consumption patterns change even more rapidly 
than the climate, and thus adaptive management must play an even more 
critical role in environmental and natural resource law under the water 
security paradigm. 
Adaptive capacity in water security is important in part because no 
paradigm in any policy field is perfect, and the water security paradigm is 
no exception.361 Other previous natural resource paradigms should 
influence its development. The climate change paradigm’s emphasis on 
renewable energy will reduce water consumption, the green paradigm’s 
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emphasis on pollution prevention and remediation will help integrate the 
Red and Green Agendas with the Blue Agenda, and the industrial paradigm 
will promote market-based incentives to encourage investment in water 
infrastructure. Where the water security paradigm is insufficient, previous 
or new paradigms can and should supplement the new dominant paradigm 
where necessary. In some instances, a national or supranational approach to 
policy leadership will be necessary because some water issues require 
governance that extends beyond the basin, including virtual water, 
desalination, and cloud seeding.362 Nevertheless, just as the industrial 
paradigm gave way to the green paradigm and the green paradigm then 
receded in influence as the climate change paradigm rose to prominence, so 
should we deemphasize climate change in order to promote a more 
resonant and integrated water security approach. 
Some supporters of the current climate change paradigm may argue 
that we lose too much with a shift to water security. For example, some 
may argue that momentum toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions will 
be lost if we shift our focus to water footprints rather than carbon 
footprints. However, renewable energies are typically more water efficient 
than nonrenewable sources, and fossil fuel combustion energy sources 
depend on enormous amounts of water.363 Thus, a reduction in water 
footprints will result in a reduction in carbon footprints.364 Furthermore, the 
water footprint framework will also account for water consumed in 
deforestation, thus accounting not only for increased carbon emissions but 
also the loss of carbon sinks.365 
Given the potential for water conflict, some climate change supporters 
could also point out that water can prove divisive.366 While it is true that 
water scarcity can result in disputes and even conflict, water is just as 
frequently a source of cooperation and often has a unifying effect.367 
Furthermore, while water security has the potential to focus policy aims on 
a contentious resource in some cases, climate change can hardly be pointed 
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to as an example of a nondivisive, unifying, conflict-free policy 
paradigm.368 
Still, there are other criticisms of the water security paradigm, and it 
will require further research either to integrate these concerns fully or to 
accommodate them in better, alternative paradigms in the future. For 
example, the water security paradigm could be implemented in ways that 
overemphasize the Blue Agenda, encouraging water uses that are either 
unsustainable or that impact aquatic or riparian habitats. The water security 
paradigm’s anthropocentric focus should not be so narrow as to exclude 
necessary considerations of biodiversity. Additionally, careful 
consideration should be given to how the water security paradigm best 
addresses issues of salt water. It has obvious implications for desalination 
as a source of drinking water. But if the water security paradigm is viewed 
too narrowly, it will not integrate important issues of displacement 
associated with sea level rise or ocean acidification.369 
Ultimately, rising sea levels present a real threat of water insecurity 
that should be integrated within the water security paradigm because water 
security should include flood resilience as well as protection of freshwater 
aquifers from saline intrusion. The water security paradigm’s approach to 
ocean acidification is somewhat attenuated—improved water efficiency 
and lowered global water footprints will cause reduced carbon emissions, 
which should mitigate some issues of ocean acidification. But there is no 
question that the water security paradigm has its limits. This Article is not 
arguing for a perfect paradigm—simply a better one that will also need to 
be supplemented by complementary policies to address problems it fails to 
integrate. 
Finally, perhaps the most significant criticism of the water security 
paradigm that will require additional research questions the degree to 
which water is more successful at spurring collective action to address 
sustainability challenges. As is evident in the climate change paradigm, 
behavioral psychology will be instructive here.370 Empirical research is 
necessary to compare how people respond to advocacy based on the 
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climate change paradigm as compared to advocacy based on the water 
security paradigm. Perhaps behavioral psychology issues such as 
compassion fatigue or optimism bias would prevent effective transmission 
of the water security approach.371 But even these questions will necessarily 
be impacted by typical concerns of bounded rationality, including the 
availability heuristic and recency bias,372 so that people in places prone to 
water-related disasters may respond better to a water security approach, 
while those in coastal areas or living near poles or glaciers respond better to 
a discourse based on climate change. 
Despite this need for careful tailoring and continued research, the 
water security paradigm represents a better approach to understanding and 
communicating natural resource policy. It speaks directly in terms of water, 
rather than indirectly in terms of carbon, and it addresses issues of 
population growth and economic development while sacrificing little of the 
important focus of climate change on weather variability. And at its core, 
the water security paradigm is about resilience of human communities to 
water variability and its implications. 
CONCLUSION 
The shift from climate change to water security is fundamentally 
about how the world should talk about sustainability challenges. Water is 
not part of the climate change problem. Rather, climate change is a 
component of the water problem. Scholarship and policy papers in natural 
resource management should not have to answer questions like, “What 
does this have to do with climate change?” Rather, scholarship and 
advocacy in natural resource and environmental law and policy should seek 
to answer the question, “What does this have to do with water security?” 
This shift in dialogue is perhaps all the more important with the new Trump 
administration’s hostility to climate change-framed policy discussions.373 
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The old climate change paradigm could now be politicized into silence. To 
avoid this and engage those who, for whatever reason, refuge to engage in 
the climate change conversation, the dialogue must change. 
But the water security paradigm is not only a matter of changing the 
dialogue surrounding sustainability. The legal reforms proposed in this 
Article will reorient our focus toward water-related disasters and water-
related economic impacts, such as food prices, which represent the threats 
of climate change most accessible and relevant to the general public. 
People naturally care most about the implications of climate change for 
themselves, their families, and their communities. And these implications 
revolve around water security. Ultimately, the only reason this blue planet 
matters so much is because it is blue. Our policy paradigm, therefore, 
should focus on what matters and resonates most. The sooner scientists and 
policymakers accept that reality and refocus efforts around something 
everyone can understand—water security—the sooner we will start 
effectively addressing our looming global sustainability crisis. Until we 
stop talking about climate change and instead concentrate on water 
security, we are just blowing hot air. And once we reframe our discussions 
about sustainability around water security, we will finally be talking about 
the actual problem and its primary solution. Our laws and our policies will 
“be water”—adaptable to a dynamic natural world and aimed at mitigating, 
or being resilient to, extreme water conditions. 
